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TURNING A BLIND EYE:  WALL STREET 
FINANCE OF PREDATORY LENDING*
Kathleen C. Engel** & Patricia A. McCoy***
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies have discussed the negative externalities that 
securitization imposes on creditors.1  Scholars have paid scant attention, 
however, to harms caused by securitization to debtors whose loans are 
securitized.2  This issue has erupted in the subprime home mortgage 
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2007.  Our thanks to Lissa Broome, Howell Jackson, Melissa Jacoby, Peter Lindseth, Jeremy 
Paul, Jim Rebitzer, Elizabeth Renuart, Steve Ross, Peter Siegelman, Michael Stegman, 
Susan Wachter, and Art Wilmarth.  We also thank Kevin Byers, John Day, Dhammika 
Dharmapala, Kurt Eggert, Keith Ernst, Sean Griffith, Claire Hill, Kathleen Keest, Kris 
Rengert, Ellen Schloemer, Lalitha Shivaswamy, Alan White, and Elvin Wyly.  We are 
grateful for the invaluable comments by faculty and other participants at seminars and 
colloquia at Harvard Law School, The Wharton School, the University of North Carolina 
School of Law, American University School of Law, and our own universities.  Our 
gratitude to Jessica Matthewson and Margaret Montano for their superb support.  Finally, 
thanks to the University of Connecticut Law School Foundation and the Cleveland-Marshall 
Fund for their generous funding. 
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*** George J. and Helen M. England Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of 
Law.  J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall).  Professor McCoy has served 
as an expert witness for plaintiffs in several predatory lending cases. 
 1. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1055 (1998); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk 
Allocation, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1997); Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 301 (2002); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale 
L.J. 1 (1996); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization:  The Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 
76 Tex. L. Rev. 595 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 
50 Duke L.J. 1541, 1580-81, 1585-86 (2001). 
 2. Kurt Eggert was among the first to discuss this issue, in the context of the holder-in-
due-course rule. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course:  Predatory Lending, Securitization, 
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 503 (2002).  Jonathan Remy 
Nash also highlighted this issue in his work on securitization and environmental superliens. 
Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-Backed 
Securitization, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 127 (2002).  Other works have examined 
securitization’s effect on third-world countries. See Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance, 
Securitization and Consensuality, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 411, 434-35 (2002); Anupam 
Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 Emory L.J. 923 (2004); Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border 
Securitization:  Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 255, 260, 265 
(1998); David W. Leebron, First Things First:  A Comment on Securitizing Third World 
Debt, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 173. 
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market, where charges of predatory lending, many of which have been 
substantiated, are mounting.3   
The vast majority of subprime loans are now securitized, leading to 
claims that securitization facilitates predatory lending and should actively 
police lenders.  Nonetheless, the entities involved in securitization have 
resisted addressing such concerns and continue to serve as major conduits 
for predatory loans.4  As this excerpt from one prospectus illustrates, 
securitization turns a blind eye to the underwriting of subprime loans:  
 With the exception of approximately 20.82% of the mortgage loans in 
the statistical mortgage pool that were underwritten in accordance with 
the underwriting criteria of The Winter Group, underwriting criteria are 
generally not available with respect to the mortgage loans.  In many 
instances the mortgage loans in the statistical mortgage pool were 
acquired by Terwin Advisors LLC from sources, including mortgage 
brokers and other non-originators, that could not provide detailed 
information regarding the underwriting guidelines of the originators.5
As this suggests, Wall Street firms securitize subprime home loans without 
determining if loan pools contain predatory loans.  In the worst situations, 
secondary market actors have actively facilitated abusive lending.6
At first blush, securitization’s lack of concern about subprime 
underwriting seems odd.  After all, investors in mortgage-backed securities 
should be concerned about the heightened default risk of subprime loans 
and predatory loans in particular.7  Furthermore, they should be concerned 
 3. See infra note 121.  The subprime market charges higher interest rates and fees and 
is designed for borrowers with weaker credit. 
 4. For instance, a 2005 study of securitized subprime loans found that 57.2 percent of 
those loans had one or more predatory features, i.e., a balloon clause or a prepayment 
penalty with a term of at least three years. See Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & 
Walter R. Davis, The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures:  The 
Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and Balloon Payments 22-23, 32 tbl.6 (Jan. 25, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).  The role of securitization 
can also be seen in predatory lending lawsuits involving loan assignees or trustees of 
securitized trusts that hold home loans. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mundaca Fin. Servs., Inc., 76 
S.W.3d 819 (Ark. 2002) (assignee); Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2005) 
(trustee); Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 616 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (trust and 
trustee); Bankers Trust Co. v. West, No. 20984, 2002 WL 31114844 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 
25, 2002) (assignee). 
 5. Merrill Lynch & Co., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated June 18, 2004 
(Form 424B5), at S-16 (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/809940/000095013604002052/0000950136-04-002052.txt.  Our thanks to Alan White 
for drawing this language to our attention. 
 6. In the most notorious example to date, in 2003, a federal jury held Lehman Brothers 
liable, as an investment bank and provider of a warehouse line of credit to the subprime 
lender First Alliance Mortgage Corp. (FAMCO), for aiding and abetting FAMCO’s fraud on 
borrowers. See infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text. 
 7. Subprime home loans are more likely than prime loans to go into default. See, e.g., 
FitchRatings, U.S. Subprime RMBS in CDOs 5-9 (Apr. 15, 2005); Michelle A. Danis & 
Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Delinquency of Subprime Mortgages 5-6 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2005-022A, 2005).  Predatory loans present an even 
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that subprime lenders will try to pass off their worst loans through 
securitization—the “lemons” problem that George Akerlof described.8
Given investors’ concerns, one might expect the capital markets to screen 
out the riskiest, predatory loans from securitized subprime loan pools.  
There is growing evidence, however, that securitizing entities perform 
inadequate screening.  When meaningful screening does occur, it focuses on 
loans originated in states that impose liability on assignees of predatory 
loans.  In states with weak anti-predatory lending laws, screening is 
minimal or non-existent. 
As we explain, securitization solves the lemons problem for investors 
without requiring the capital markets to screen out predatory loans from 
securitized offerings.  Investment banks employ a variety of techniques, 
primarily structured finance and deal provisions, to shield investors from 
virtually all of the credit and litigation risk associated with predatory loans.  
Market and legal forces provide additional protection to investors.  For 
example, the holder-in-due-course rule shields investors and securitized 
trusts from most litigation contesting predatory loan terms.  Evidence also 
suggests that investors extract price concessions as recompense for the 
lemons problem, which pushes up the cost to borrowers of subprime loans.  
As a result, investors can safely invest in top-rated subprime mortgage-
backed securities without worrying about losses, even when the underlying 
loan pools are replete with questionable loans.9
The protections that securitization provides investors do not safeguard 
borrowers.  To the contrary, securitization inflicts negative externalities on 
subprime borrowers in at least four ways.  First, securitization funds small, 
thinly capitalized lenders and brokers, thus enabling them to enter the 
subprime market.  These originators are more prone to commit loan abuses 
because they are less heavily regulated, have reduced reputational risk, and 
operate with low capital, helping to make them judgment-proof.  Second, 
securitization dilutes incentives by lenders and brokers to avoid making 
loans with excessive default risk by allowing them to shift that risk to the 
secondary market, which has other ways to protect itself.  Third, 
securitization denies injured borrowers legal recourse against assignees by 
triggering the holder-in-due-course rule and impeding work-outs.  Lastly, 
securitization drives up the price of subprime loans because investors 
demand a lemons premium for investing in subprime mortgage-backed 
securities. 
higher risk of default than subprime loans generally. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra 
note 4, at 25, 35 tbl.10. 
 8. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970). 
 9. See Stephen Wallenstein, Situating Project Finance and Securitization in Context:  A 
Comment on Bjerre, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 449, 451 (2002) (“[N]egative effects on 
select populations are not a concern of . . . securitization (by which I mean the financing 
aspects).”). 
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The resulting cost to borrowers is substantial.  One recent study 
estimated that lengthy prepayment penalties in securitized subprime loans 
boosted borrowers’ risk of foreclosure by sixteen to twenty percent.10  
Balloon clauses in those loans raised borrowers’ risk of foreclosure by an 
additional fifty percent.11  Securitization also exacts significant tolls on 
municipalities by fueling predatory lending.  When borrowers, saddled with 
onerous loan payments, lose or cannot maintain their homes, cities must 
contend with abandoned and deteriorating properties, which strain city 
resources and threaten the vitality and stability of neighborhoods.12
Given securitization’s role in enabling and perpetuating predatory 
lending, we contend that the law should impose full, quantifiable assignee 
liability on securitized trusts that do not adopt adequate controls to filter out 
predatory loans from loan pools.  Today, new automated due diligence 
software makes it technologically and economically efficient to screen out 
loans with predatory features. 
In an earlier article, we proposed federal legislation to require subprime 
lenders and brokers to make suitable loans.13  In this Article, we argue that 
assignee liability should apply to suitability violations and certain other 
legal violations by mortgage brokers and lenders.  Imposing properly 
tailored liability on securitizers would force them to take into account the 
negative externalities of securitization on borrowers and communities.14
Our analysis of the securitization of subprime residential mortgages 
expands the debate about negative externalities from securitization by 
demonstrating that such externalities are not necessarily limited to 
originators’ unsecured creditors.  To the contrary, securitization can impose 
negative externalities on debtors who are liable on the underlying 
receivables, as well as on surrounding communities. 
Moreover, our research helps explain why securitization has taken root.  
Claire Hill has argued, for instance, that securitization exists because 
valuing a lender’s receivables is simpler than valuing the lender itself.  
Professor Hill offers the further insight that thinly capitalized lenders—
which she dubs “lemons firms”—have the most to gain from securitizing 
 10. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 4, at 25. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing?  Redressing the Externalities of 
Predatory Lending, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 355 (2006) (describing externalities that predatory 
lending imposes on cities); see also William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, Collateral Damage:  
The Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage Foreclosure Boom 4 (May 11, 2005), available 
at http://www.hpfonline.org/PDF/Apgar-Duda_study_final.pdf (estimating that vacant 
properties from foreclosures cost cities more than $30,000 per unit in some cases); Family 
Housing Fund, Cost Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention 16-17 (1998) 
(estimating that Minneapolis and St. Paul lost $2000 on average in tax revenues on vacant 
homes and spent up to $40,000 per home rehabilitated and $10,000 per home demolished). 
 13. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:  The Law 
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255 (2002). 
 14. See Janger, supra note 1, at 302, 315. 
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their receivables.15  We extend her analysis by arguing that securitization 
solves two “lemons” problems, not one:  the originator’s possible 
bankruptcy and adverse selection in the loans being sold and ultimately 
securitized. 
Finally, our research implicitly questions the binary nature of the larger 
debate about negative externalities from securitization.  Too often, the 
debate is framed as whether securitization must be defended from all attack 
or altered at its core.16  The parable of the subprime market, however, 
suggests that there may be a middle, low-cost course that can protect 
borrowers from loan abuses without impeding securitization. 
The Article unfolds as follows:  In Part I, we provide a brief definition of 
predatory lending.  Part II describes the growth of subprime securitization, 
while Part III provides a thumbnail sketch of securitization of subprime 
home mortgage loans.  In Part IV, we discuss the risks posed by subprime 
securitization and the resulting lemons problem that investors face.  Part V 
analyzes how securitization solves the lemons problem through a variety of 
techniques, including sequential tranches, pricing, limited due diligence, 
and contract provisions.  In Part VI, we explain why predatory lending 
persists despite the substantial risk management techniques employed by 
securitization.  Part VII presents normative justifications for imposing 
assignee liability on residential mortgage-backed securitizations, while Part 
VIII sets forth the details of our assignee liability proposal.  Finally, in Part 
IX, we respond to critics of assignee liability for predatory loans. 
I.  PREDATORY LENDING DEFINED 
Predatory lending is a syndrome of loan abuses that benefit mortgage 
brokers, lenders, and securitizers to the serious detriment of borrowers.17  
Such abuses include the following:  
(1)  Loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to 
borrowers:  A major example is asset-based lending, which consists of 
loans to borrowers whom the lender knows cannot afford the monthly 
payments.  Pushing borrowers to take on more debt than they need, steering 
prime-eligible borrowers to subprime loans, and refinancing low-interest 
loans into costlier loans with no justification can also inflict seriously 
disproportionate net harm on borrowers.18
 15. Claire A. Hill, Securitization:  A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 
1061, 1091-92 (1996); accord Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization 
and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. Legal Stud. 161, 180-82 (2005). 
 16. Compare sources cited in supra notes 1, 2, and 10, representing different viewpoints 
in this debate. 
 17. Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1259-70. 
 18. Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting:  Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and 
Fairer for America’s Families, ch. 5 & nn.5-6 (1996), http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
corporate/reports/moseley/chap5.htm; see also Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, MBA Best 
Practices ¶ III (2007), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/IndustryResources/ 
StandardsandBestPractices/MBABestPractices.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); Patricia 
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(2)  Rent seeking:  Numerous subprime loans charge fees and interest 
rates that are exorbitant compared to the risk that the borrowers present.  
Rent seeking also encompasses steering and charging prepayment penalties 
and points without a corresponding cut in the interest rate, as is customary 
in the prime market.19
(3)  Loans involving illegal fraud or deception:  Many predatory loans 
involve fraud or deception by brokers or lenders.  For example, brokers or 
lenders may procure inflated appraisals or make false promises to refinance 
loans down the road on better terms.20
(4)  Other forms of non-transparency that do not amount to fraud:  These 
occur when lenders or brokers withhold information from borrowers in 
circumstances that fall short of fraud.  For example, subprime lenders keep 
rate sheets containing their prices secret because they do not want 
borrowers to shop for better rates.21  Neither the Truth in Lending Act22 nor 
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act23 requires disclosure of rate 
sheets to borrowers.24  This secrecy impedes comparison shopping. 
(5)  Loans requiring borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress:  
Subprime loans often contain mandatory arbitration clauses that require 
borrowers to take disputes to arbitration and preclude them from joining 
class actions.  Such provisions deny borrowers access to the courts.25
(6)  Lending discrimination:  Many predatory loans impose more 
onerous terms on members of protected groups, resulting in discrimination 
even after controlling for risk.26
(7)  Servicing abuses:  Once loans are securitized, a servicer typically 
becomes responsible for collecting the loan payments and distributing the 
Sturdevant & William J. Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of Predatory Lending Practices, 
Consumer Advoc., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 36, 37, 39. 
 19.  Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending:  An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 
Hous. Pol’y Debate 533, 535 (2004); Sturdevant & Brennan, supra note 18, at 38-39; Alan 
M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing:  Present and Future Research, 15 Housing Pol’y 
Debate 503 (2004); Mark Shroder, The Value of the Sunshine Cure:  Efficacy of the RESPA 
Disclosure Strategy 11 fig.2, 14-15, 14 tbl.4 (Apr. 4, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Fordham Law Review). 
 20. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. & -Dep’t of the Treasury Task Force on Predatory 
Lending, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending 24, 79-80 (2000) [hereinafter 
Treasury-HUD Report], available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/ 
curbing.html. 
 21. White, supra note 19, at 509-12; see also Peter J. Hong & Marcos Reza, Hidden 
Costs to Homeowners:  The Prevalent Non-Disclosure of Yield Spread Premiums in 
Mortgage Loan Transactions, 18 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 131, 132-34 (2005) (describing 
rate sheets). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000). 
 23. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617. 
 24. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1305-07. 
 25. Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:  Consumer 
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1191, 1193 
(2001). 
 26. See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst & Wei Li, Unfair Lending:  The 
Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages (2006), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011-Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf. 
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proceeds.  Some servicers have employed abusive servicing practices, 
including charging unjustified fees, actively pushing borrowers into default, 
and employing exploitative collection methods.27
II.  THE ADVENT OF SUBPRIME SECURITIZATION 
Subprime securitization, a relatively new phenomenon, followed on the 
heels of securitization in the prime residential loan market, first pioneered 
in the late 1970s.28  By the early 1990s, technological advances made it 
possible to estimate and price the risk of subprime home loan pools, paving 
the way for subprime securitizations.29  In 2005, total securitizations of 
subprime and home equity loans ballooned to an estimated $525.7 billion.30  
Today, lenders securitize almost eighty percent of subprime mortgages.31
III.  HOW SECURITIZATION WORKS 
Securitization is the financial technology that integrates the market for 
residential mortgages with the capital markets.  In securitization, investment 
banks take pools of home loans, carve up the cash flows from those 
receivables, and convert the cash flows into bonds that are secured by the 
mortgages.  The bonds are variously known as residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) or asset-backed securities (ABS). 
Securitization goes by the moniker “structured finance,” in part because a 
securitizer structures the transaction to isolate the loan pool from the 
original lender.  This is accomplished by selling the loan pool to a special 
purpose vehicle or “SPV” that is owned by, but legally distinct from, the 
lender.  The SPV then resells the loan pool to a second SPV, which is also 
independent of the lender and takes title to the bundle.  The second SPV is 
typically in the form of a trust.32
 27. Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 Housing 
Pol’y Debate 753, 756-61 (2004). 
 28. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Bruce A. Markell & Lissa Lamkin Broome, 
Securitization, Structured Finance and Capital Markets 1-3 (2004); Michael H. Schill, 
Uniformity or Diversity:  Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the 
Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1267-71 (1991). 
 29. See, e.g., Eric Bruskin, Anthony B. Sanders & David Sykes, The Nonagency 
Mortgage Market:  Background and Overview, in The Handbook of Nonagency Mortgage-
Backed Securities 5, 12-16 (Frank J. Fabozzi, Chuck Ramsey & Michael Marz eds., 2d ed. 
2000); Bill Shepherd, Perils and Phantasm:  The Mortgage Securitization Boom Is 
Threatened by Recession, Legislation and Rate Change, Investment Dealers Dig., Feb. 3, 
2003. 
 30. See Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Rating Transitions 2005:  U.S. RMBS Volume and 
Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, tbl.1 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 31. See S&P, The Subprime Market 7 (June 17, 2005). 
 32. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1539, 
1552-53 (2004).  This Article focuses on the “nonconforming” or “private label” market.  
The conforming market refers to home loans that conform to underwriting guidelines of 
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The GSEs 
purchase and package conforming individual mortgages, create the securities, and market the 
securities through brokers. See Freddie Mac, The Secondary Market for Mortgage Loans, 
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This two-tiered structure protects investors by preventing lenders’ 
creditors from reaching the assets backing the securities in case the lender 
goes bankrupt.33  Bankruptcy remoteness also boosts ratings of securitized 
offerings.  Rating agencies evaluate and rate securitized loan pools.  To the 
extent that SPVs protect investors from the risk of the lender’s bankruptcy, 
it is often possible for the loan bundle to earn a higher rating than the lender 
itself would receive.  In this way, “non-investment grade and unrated 
originators (the majority of the market) [can] create investment-grade 
transactions.”34
After the loans are transferred to the second SPV, the investment bank 
for the issuer35 carves the principal and interest payments into tranches of 
bonds.36  Then, rating agencies gauge the credit risk of each tranche by 
comparing the loan pool’s characteristics with historical data and 
forecasting the tranche’s performance.37  In calculating credit risk, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/what_we_do/secmkt.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2007).  The nonconforming market, in contrast, finances loans that do not meet the GSE 
guidelines. 
 33. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. 
& Fin. 133, 142 (1994).  In many securitizations, a subsidiary of the lender retains some of 
the risk, either in the form of subordinate tranches, subordinated excess spread, or cash 
reserves.  If a lender were to retain those residual interests within its own corporate entity 
and later went into bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court might rule that the lender, not the 
investors, owned the securitized pool, relegating the investors to the role of secured 
creditors. See Len Blum & Chris DiAngelo, Structuring Efficient Asset-Backed 
Transactions, in Asset-Backed Securities 237, 243-44 (Anand K. Bhattacharya & Frank J. 
Fabozzi eds., 1996).  Only on rare occasions have courts disregarded bankruptcy-remote 
status. See Michael J. Cohn, Note, Asset Securitization:  How Remote Is Bankruptcy 
Remote?, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 929 (1998); see also Schwarcz, Markell & Broome, supra note 
28, at 80-86; Kenneth M. Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities:  Costs and Benefits 
of “Bankruptcy Remoteness” (Apr. 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Fordham Law Review) (finding that bankruptcy remoteness protects investors and is priced 
into the securities). 
 34. Henry C. McCall III & Len Blum, Evolution of the B&C Home-Equity Loan 
Securities Market, in Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 137, 140. 
 35. The issuer is the special purpose vehicle (SPV) that issues the securities. 
 36. Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) use a senior-subordinate tranche 
structure and are the most common type of nonconforming mortgage-backed security (MBS) 
today. See Bruskin, Sanders & Sykes, supra note 29, at 14.  CMOs are derivatives which 
consist of interest payments plus principal, interest-only (IO) strips, or principal-only (PO) 
strips.  Other, less common types of MBS include mortgage pass-through securities, in 
which investors buy fractional interests in pools of whole single-family mortgages, and 
mortgage-backed bonds (MBBs), which are priced according to the liquidation value of the 
loans and thus require higher collateral than CMOs. See Andrew Davidson et al., 
Securitization:  Structuring and Investment Analysis 185-87, 196, 206-08 (2003); John R. 
Brick, A Primer on Mortgage-Backed Securities, in Current Readings on Money, Banking, 
and Financial Markets 25, 26, 29-32 (James S. Wilcox & Frederic S. Mishkin eds., 1987). 
 37. See Neil D. Baron, The Role of Rating Agencies in the Securitization Process, in A 
Primer on Securitization 81 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996); see also 
Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 24-25; McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 142.  Typically 
the loan review scrutinizes the lender’s underwriting standards, borrower profiles, the 
geographical distribution of the loans, loan size, loan-to-value ratios, and the prepayment 
characteristics of the bundle.  The rating agency will perform a static pool analysis on the 
lender’s historical loss and delinquency record, using data on the average loss, slope, and 
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however, rating agencies do not assess the suitability of the underlying 
loans for individual borrowers. 
The tranche system is termed a “senior-subordinate structure” and is the 
“predominant structure of choice in subprime RMBS.”38  The tranches are 
arrayed from the most senior to the most junior, with “as many as five 
mezzanine or subordinated tranches going down the ratings ladder” from 
AAA to B.39  The senior class is the AAA tranche, the mezzanine class 
consists of the AA and A tranches, and the BBB, BB, B, and unrated 
classes take the junior position.40  Any rating of BBB-/Baa3 or above is 
deemed investment-grade and serves to assuage investors’ concerns about 
the credit quality of the mortgages backing the securities. 
In a feature known as a “waterfall,” the senior tranche is paid off before 
any other tranche.  Once the senior tranche is paid off, the next tranche 
moves to the head of the line for principal payments until all of the tranches 
are retired.41  As a result, the junior tranche is the first to absorb any losses 
and shields the senior tranches from losses due to loan defaults.42  Only in 
the extremely unlikely event that losses exceeded the amounts due the 
holders of the junior tranches would the senior tranches absorb credit 
losses. 
Before rating agencies issue investment-grade ratings, they insist on 
added financial cushions known as “credit enhancements.”43  According to 
rating agencies, when determining the needed level of credit enhancements, 
they assume catastrophic losses on an order of magnitude of the Great 
Depression, with the amount of enhancements depending on the rating 
desired, the type of collateral, and the reliability of the historical pool 
data.44
peak loss period of the loan pool to forecast future losses and delinquencies.  In addition, the 
rating agency will assess the average coupon rate, seasoning, and average maturity of the 
loans and sample the loan files to test those statistics. See Baron, supra, at 84-85; Anand K. 
Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi, The Expanding Frontiers of Asset Securitization, in Asset-
Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 1, 14; Suzanne Michaud, A Rating Agency Perspective 
on Asset-Backed Securitization, in Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 269, 271-73. 
 38. S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products:  Fourth-Quarter 2003 LTV 
Ratios, FICO Scores, and Credit Support Levels (2004). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Structured Finance:  A Guide to the Principles of Asset Securitization § 2.4 (3d ed. 2003). 
 39. Shepherd, supra note 29; see Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 20; Schwarcz, 
Markell & Broome, supra note 28, at 4-5; Hill, supra note 15, at 1070 n.39 (describing the 
rating systems used by major rating agencies). 
 40. See Lakhbir Hayre, A Concise Guide to Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs), in 
Salomon Smith Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities 9, 54-60 
(Lakhbir Hayre ed., 2001). 
 41. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 208-09, 333; Blum & DiAngelo, supra note 
33, at 257-58. 
 42. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 333; S&P, Rating Transitions 2003:  Another 
Record Year of Credit Performance for U.S. RMBS (2004). 
 43. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 24-26; Schwarcz, Markell & Broome, supra 
note 28, at 14; Blum & DiAngelo, supra note 33, at 252-53; Leon T. Kendall, Securitization:  
A New Era in American Finance, in A Primer on Securitization, supra note 37, at 4; McCall 
& Blum, supra note 34, at 140-41. 
 44. See Baron, supra note 37, at 85; Michaud, supra note 37, at 272. 
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Credit enhancements come in two types, internal and external 
enhancements.45  Normally, the lender will provide sufficient internal 
enhancements to boost the offering to an investment-grade rating.  If the 
internal enhancements do not raise the senior tranche to a top AAA rating, 
monoline insurers or other outside providers may add external 
enhancements to raise the senior tranche to an AAA.46   
Once investment-grade ratings are in hand, the investment bank will 
price the mortgage-backed securities and sell them to investors, either 
through a public offering or a private placement.47  If the offering succeeds 
as planned, the lender receives two forms of revenue.  The first is cash from 
the sale of the securities.  The second is “excess spread,” which is the right 
to any interest on the loans that exceeds the interest paid to the investors 
after deducting expenses on the asset-backed bonds.  In most situations, the 
present value of the cash proceeds plus the excess spread exceeds the cash 
that the lender would have received from selling whole loans.48
IV.  THE LEMONS PROBLEM 
In order to succeed, securitization must solve a core problem—that is, 
why should investors buy mortgage-backed securities when lenders can 
deceive them about the quality of the loans in the loan pool?  Lenders have 
incentives to cherry-pick their loans and sell the worst ones to investors.49  
And knowing that they can unload the worst loans onto investors, lenders 
have less reason to underwrite loans carefully.  Thus, securitization gives 
 45. Internal credit enhancements earmark part of the cash flow from the mortgages to 
fund a cash buffer to protect the senior and mezzanine tranches from losses.  The most 
common internal enhancements are the senior-subordinate structure, excess spread accounts, 
and over-collateralization. See Baron, supra note 37, at 85-87; Brick, supra note 36, at 29-
32; Bruskin, Sanders & Sykes, supra note 29, at 31-35; Lina Hsu & Cyrus Mohebbi, Credit 
Enhancement in ABS Structures, in Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 277, 281-83.  
Most external credit enhancements consist of guarantees by monoline insurance companies. 
See Baron, supra note 37, at 86-87; Hsu & Mohebbi, supra, at 278-80. 
 46. See Schwarcz, supra note 38, §§ 2:3, 2:4; Hsu & Mohebbi, supra note 45, at 278. 
 47. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 20; Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third 
World Debt, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 137, 141. 
 48. See McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 141-43. 
 49. As the president of one of the largest mortgage lenders put it in announcing that the 
company planned to securitize all of its subprime loans, “‘We’re looking to hold only 
pristine product on the balance sheet.’” Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, How American 
Lenders Shelter Themselves, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 2005, at C1 (quoting Stanford Kurland, 
President, Countrywide Financial Corp.).  Similarly, Armando Falcon, Jr., the former 
director of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, testified before Congress that 
Fannie Mae cherry-picked the loans it securitized and kept the best in portfolio, consistent 
with its policy to “keep the best; sell the rest.” OFHEO Agreement with Fannie Mae:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enterrs. of the H. 
Fin. Servs. Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Armando Falcon, Jr., Director, Office 
of Fed. Hous. Enterprise Oversight). 
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rise to the problem of adverse selection or the “lemons” problem, in the 
words of George Akerlof.50
Before the advent of securitization, lenders typically handled loans from 
cradle to grave.  They solicited loan applicants, underwrote and financed 
the mortgages, serviced the loans, and held the loans in portfolio to 
maturity.  In turn, lenders largely made profits from the interest payments 
on the loans.  Because lenders bore the full risk of default, they had strong 
incentives to turn down observationally risky borrowers.51
Securitization alters this incentive structure by unbundling the tasks in 
lending and parceling them out among a string of market actors.  A 
mortgage broker may recruit loan applicants, a lender may originate the 
loans, a specialist firm may provide the servicing, a trust may hold the 
loans, and outside investors may provide the financing. 
The lemons problem occurs because unbundling creates information 
asymmetries that mortgage lenders (or brokers) can exploit to investors’ 
detriment.52  A loan’s credit risk turns on numerous characteristics, some of 
which are observable and others of which are not.  Neither the lender nor 
investors are privy to characteristics that are unobservable.  However, the 
lender has observable data on borrowers’ default propensities that investors 
lack.53  Investors do not interview the loan applicants, do not obtain or 
review property appraisals, and almost never examine individual loan 
applications, borrowers’ credit reports, or income verifications.  Instead, 
they rely on the issuer’s warranties and representations about the borrowers’ 
credit quality.  Needless to say, in the subprime sector, these information 
asymmetries can be pronounced because subprime borrowers are prone to 
have credit flaws that lenders will want to conceal. 
In sum, securitization enables lenders “to shift the risk [of the loan’s 
performance] onto the investor.”54  The more that securitization allows 
lenders to “take the profits and run,” the more adverse selection will rear its 
 50. See Akerlof, supra note 8; Amy C. Cutts et al., Lemons with a Twist:  Adverse 
Selection and the Role of Securitization in Mortgage Market Evolution and Pricing (June 
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 51. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1981). 
 52. When lenders use mortgage brokers, the brokers have even fuller information than 
the lenders about observable characteristics of the borrower.  Lenders who securitize loans 
may be indifferent to deceit by brokers about default risks if they can shift the risk of loss 
wholesale to the secondary market. See Patrick Barta, Is Appraisal Process Skewing Home 
Values?, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 2001, at A1. 
 53. See Cutts et al., supra note 50; Wayne Passmore & Roger W. Sparks, Automated 
Underwriting and the Profitability of Mortgage Securitization, 28 Real Est. Econ. 285, 285 
(2000) (describing how lenders try to conceal borrowers’ bad credit histories from 
investors). 
 54. Lalitha A. Shivaswamy, Structured Transactions and Private Placement Criteria and 
Challenges to Investment in the 144A Market 5 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Fordham Law Review).  As one set of researchers recently observed, “[T]he market for 
multi-class MBS is a market for lemon mortgage pools.” Chris Downing, Dwight Jaffee & 
Nancy Wallace, Information Asymmetries in the Mortgage Backed Securities Market 20 
(May 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
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head.55  Solving adverse selection is the key to successful securitization of 
home loans.  In the home mortgage context, securitization must solve the 
lemons problem for three types of risk—credit risk, prepayment risk, and 
litigation risk—which we now discuss. 
A.  Credit Risk 
Credit risk is the risk that a borrower will miss payments and the loan 
will go into default.  All loans involve credit risk, but subprime loans 
involve more risk than prime loans because borrowers with impaired credit 
are more likely to default.56  Furthermore, when a predatory lender makes a 
loan to a borrower whom it knows cannot afford the monthly loan 
payments, default will likely become a self-fulfilling prophecy.57
Investment banks and rating agencies measure the credit risk in loan 
pools by extrapolating from historical data on loan pools with similar 
characteristics.  In the subprime market, several factors make these 
historical inferences more difficult.  First, there is less historical data on 
subprime loan pools than prime pools, because subprime securitizations did 
not take off until the early 1990s.  Second, subprime loan pools present 
much larger variance in credit risk.  Prime loan pools are limited to the most 
creditworthy “A” grade borrowers and cover a narrow band of the credit 
risk spectrum.  Moreover, the risk associated with that narrow band has 
been empirically tested and confirmed over time.  Newer subprime loan 
pools, in contrast, can cover the entire risk spectrum, from A and A- 
borrowers down to the weakest D borrowers.58  Third, foreclosure costs 
vary by state, complicating the job of estimating default costs.59  Finally, 
many subprime securitizations are sold on a to-be-announced (TBA) basis, 
where the lender does not actually form the loan pool until the mortgage-
backed securities have been sold, making historical comparisons impossible 
 55. See Cutts et al., supra note 50; Passmore & Sparks, supra note 53, at 285.  George 
Akerlof commented on a similar problem affecting middlemen in India who tried to 
arbitrage between the cheap loan rates of central city banks and the exorbitant loan rates of 
local moneylenders who had personal knowledge of the borrowers, observing, “The 
middleman who tries to arbitrage between the rates of the moneylender and the central bank 
is apt to attract all the ‘lemons’ and thereby make a loss.” Akerlof, supra note 8, at 499. 
 56. John C. Weicher, The Home Equity Lending Industry:  Refinancing Mortgages for 
Borrowers with Impaired Credit 76 (1997); Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime and Prime 
Mortgages:  Loss Distributions 7 (Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, Working Paper No. 
03-1, 2003). 
 57. For discussion of why a lender might make a loan that is virtually certain to go into 
default, see Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1280-89. 
 58. See Weicher, supra note 56, at 56-57 tbl.4.1. 
 59. See Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect of State Foreclosure Laws 
on Loan Losses:  Evidence from the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. Money, Credit & 
Banking 221, 222 (1990); Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection 
Laws, 77 Va. L. Rev. 489 (1991). 
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before the offering has been closed.60  These blind spots in evaluating 
subprime credit risk can hamper efforts to accurately set prices and gauge 
returns. 
B.  Prepayment Risk 
Prepayment risk is the risk that borrowers will pay off their principal 
before maturity.  Prepayment disrupts investors’ cash flows in two ways.  
First, it accelerates the return of principal.  Second, it cancels future cash 
flows from interest payments.  If borrowers prepay when interest rates are 
below coupon (i.e., the nominal interest rate on the loan), investors who 
want equivalent risk are forced to reinvest the principal at a lower rate of 
return. 
Borrowers in the prime and subprime markets prepay for different 
reasons.  In the prime market, prepayment most often occurs when 
homeowners refinance their mortgages to take advantage of falling interest 
rates.61  In the subprime market, borrowers often have more difficulty 
qualifying for new loans, making them less sensitive to drops in interest 
rates.62  Instead, subprime prepayments tend to occur for two reasons, one 
voluntary in nature and one involuntary.  Voluntary prepayments take place 
when subprime borrowers improve their credit scores and refinance into 
prime products at lower rates.  Involuntary prepayments, in contrast, are 
triggered by “loan flipping,” in which lenders persuade subprime borrowers 
to refinance their loans repeatedly at short intervals in order to extract high 
fees.63  Lenders can manufacture future loan flips by structuring the 
original loans so that borrowers will eventually be unable to repay.64
 60. See Jacob Boudoukh et al., Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities in a Multifactor 
Interest Rate Environment:  A Multivariate Density Estimation Approach, 10 Rev. Fin. Stud. 
405, 410, 419 (1997). 
 61. See id. at 406, 437; Amy Crews Cutts & Robert Van Order, On the Economics of 
Subprime Lending 3, 7 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-01, 2004). 
 62. Subprime prepayments do rise as interest rates fall. See, e.g., Quercia, Stegman & 
Davis, supra note 4, at 21.  But subprime “borrowers’ limited refinancing opportunities” 
mean that “refinancing rates must fall 200 to 300 basis points (bps) to significantly increase 
prepayments due to refinancing in the [subprime] market versus the 25 to 50 bps that move 
the private [prime] MBS market.”  R. Russell Hurst, Securities Backed by Closed-End Home 
Equity Loans, in The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed Securities 281, 292 (Frank J. Fabozzi, 
ed., 5th ed. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 63. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 515; ABSNet, Glossary, 
http://www.absnet.net/help/gloss-new.asp#I (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (defining involuntary 
prepayment). 
 64. For example, a loan might include a hefty prepayment penalty that would be 
triggered if the borrower refinanced immediately before or after the interest rate on an 
adjustable rate mortgage adjusted.  Alternatively, a large balloon clause can exert pressure 
on a borrower to agree to a loan flip if the borrower’s credit rating has fallen too far to 
refinance elsewhere on better terms. 
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C.  Litigation Risk 
Investors face the further risk that borrowers will sue the trusts that hold 
the securitized loans for wrongdoing in the origination of those loans.  
Successful borrower litigation, especially litigation that results in large 
compensatory or punitive damages awards against the trust, can have a 
negative and serious impact on investors’ returns.  Thus, securitization 
deals must be structured to avoid litigation risk altogether or to predict and 
price it efficiently. 
Trusts expose themselves to liability if they aid or participate in unlawful 
activities by loan originators, most often by being involved with the actual 
loan underwriting.  Such participation can give rise to liability for violations 
of an array of laws ranging from consumer protection and credit 
discrimination statutes to conspiracy and fair housing laws.65
Some laws impose liability on assignees even absent active wrongdoing.  
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) allows borrowers to recover against 
assignees for originators’ violations if the violations are “apparent on the 
face of” federal disclosure statements.66  The principal federal anti-
predatory lending law, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA),67 imposes strict liability on assignees who purchase specific 
high-cost loans.  In general, holders of HOEPA loans are “subject to all 
claims and defenses . . . that the borrower could assert against the originator 
of the mortgage.”68  Regulations implementing the Federal Trade 
Commission Act impose liability on assignees for “all claims and defenses 
which the debtor could assert against the seller.”69  Lastly, several states 
have enacted anti-predatory lending laws that impose liability on 
assignees.70  Although these statutes allow for assignee liability, in reality 
 65. See, e.g., Wise v. Union Acceptance Corp., No. 02-0104, 2002 WL 31730920, at *3 
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2002) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Cooper v. First Gov’t Mortgage 
& Investors Corp., No. 00-0536, 2002 WL 31520158, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2002) 
(consumer protection law); Hays v. Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., 46 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1999) (conspiracy law); Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 
537-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (Fair Housing Act). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a), (e)(2) (2000).  Furthermore, if an originator fails to make the 
required disclosures to borrowers, the borrower may exercise the right of rescission against 
the assignee even if the TILA violation is not apparent on the face of the loan documents. Id. 
§ 1641(c). 
 67. Id. §§ 1601-1667. 
 68. Id. § 1641(d)(1). 
 69. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2005).  This so-called FTC Rule only governs home mortgage 
loans that involve the sale of goods or services. Id.  Some courts have construed the rule to 
hold, however, that if state consumer protection laws do not permit affirmative relief, 
consumers are limited to defensive actions against assignees. See, e.g., LaBarre v. Credit 
Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 70. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:10B-27(b)-(e) (West Supp. 2006); N.Y. Banking Law 
§ 6-l(7), (11)-(13) (McKinney Supp. 2007). See generally Baher Azmy, Squaring the 
Predatory Lending Circle, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 295 (2005) (surveying state laws).  Increasingly, 
federal regulators have preempted state anti-predatory lending laws that impose assignee 
liability. See Bank Activities and Operations:  Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34) (ruling that OCC 
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the application of the laws is quite narrow.  In some cases, the laws require 
active participation by the assignees.  In others, the laws only apply to a 
small fraction of loans, as is true for HOEPA.71
For most potential claims, however, assignees who have distanced 
themselves from the unlawful activities of originators can find shelter in the 
holder-in-due course doctrine, which insulates them from most claims for 
unconscionability, breach of contract, and fraud.72  To satisfy the 
requirements of a holder in due course, the purchaser must be the holder of 
a negotiable note, who took the note for value, in good faith, and without 
notice that the note contains certain defects.73  To meet the definition of a 
“holder,” the assignee must possess the note and the note must be “issued or 
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank.”74  If a note is 
payable to an identified person or entity, the note must bear an endorsement 
or be among a group of loans to which an allonge was attached.75  When 
assignees qualify as holders in due course, they take the notes free of most 
defenses to nonpayment and affirmative claims that borrowers could have 
pursued against the originators. 
There are scenarios under which borrowers can defeat assignees’ status 
as holders in due course.  When an assignee has notice of a potential claim, 
for example, that a note was obtained through fraud, the assignee is deemed 
to have sufficient notice to abrogate its status as a holder in due course.76  
Assignees obviously have “notice” if they played a role in the 
wrongdoing.77  Notice similarly exists if the borrower brought the claim 
against the assignor prior to the assignment.78   
In other instances, failures by originators to comply with technical 
requirements of the holder-in-due-course rule can open the door to assignee 
liability.79  Despite the demanding nature of these requirements, failure to 
enforcement preempts state anti-predatory lending laws’ application to national banks).  On 
a parallel front, states have preempted many local lending ordinances that contemplate 
assignee liability. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 
(Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding New York City’s anti-predatory lending ordinance preempted by 
state and federal law). 
 71. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) covers at best only about 
five percent of subprime first-lien home mortgage loans. See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 65,604, 65,608 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
 72. James White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §§ 14-1, 14-2 
(2000). 
 73. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005). 
 74. White & Summers, supra note 72, § 14-3. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. § 14-7 (discussing cases). 
 77. See, e.g., Williams v. Cent. Money Co., 974 F. Supp. 22, 28 (D.D.C. 1997) (denying 
summary judgment for assignees on fraud and unconscionability claims where there was 
evidence that the assignee “participated in the fraud perpetrated by” the assignor). 
 78. See Fairbanks Capital Corp. v. Summerall, No. 02AP-864, 2003 WL 1700487, at *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2003). 
 79. For example, a note that requires performance other than a promise to make the 
payments due is not negotiable and thus does not give rise to the holder-in-due-course 
defense if it is sold. See White & Summers, supra note 72, § 14-4 (discussing cases).  
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comply with the technical requirements of the holder-in-due-course rule is 
rarely litigated in predatory home loan cases. 
Courts have also held that assignees can lose holder-in-due-course 
protection if their relationships with loan originators were sufficiently close 
to make the assignees agents of the originators.80  Even where no agency 
relationship exists between the originator and the assignee, courts have 
imputed knowledge of an originator’s wrongdoing to an assignee based on 
the strength and nature of ties between the assignor and the assignee.81
To recap, credit risk, prepayment risk, and litigation risk have the 
potential to make investors gun-shy about investing in securitizations.  
Allaying these concerns is a central task of structured finance. 
V.  HOW STRUCTURED FINANCE SOLVES THE LEMONS PROBLEM 
In order to attract outside investors, securitization must solve the lemons 
problem in all of its three guises:  credit risk, prepayment risk, and litigation 
risk.  In this section, we describe how securitization reduces these risks 
through a variety of techniques.  Notably, securitization can insulate 
investors from the risks of predatory lending without excluding predatory 
loans from securitized loan pools.  In the process, securitization solves the 
lemons problem for investors without discouraging predatory lending itself. 
A.  The Protections Provided by Sequential Tranches 
One way securitization protects investors from credit risk is through 
sequential tranches.  According to Fitch Ratings, defaults in the subprime 
market “start in month seven, ramp up to a peak in months 28-42, and end 
at month 120.”82  For this reason, risk-averse investors—the ones most 
concerned with loan default—want to be paid off as quickly as possible.  
Investors who are most risk-averse buy the AAA tranche, investors who are 
slightly less risk-averse buy the AA tranche, and so it goes down the line.  
The senior tranche is retired first, followed by the AA tranche, etc., 
enabling the investors who are most risk-averse to get paid first.  
Originators sometimes—but not always—hold the most junior, and 
therefore the riskiest, tranches.83  This technique has worked so well that 
the safest subprime tranches—the senior tranches—virtually never suffer 
credit losses. 
Likewise, when notes lack the proper endorsements or are not in the possession of the 
assignee, they are not negotiable. See id. § 14-3 (discussing cases). 
 80. See, e.g., England v. MG Invs., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 718, 722-23 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) 
(denying summary judgment on a fraud claim where evidence showed that the originator 
was acting as an agent of the assignee). 
 81. See Williams, 974 F. Supp. at 26-27 (imputing knowledge to the assignee where an 
officer of the originator, who had “direct contact” with the borrower, was alleged to be a 
principal and shareholder of the assignee). 
 82. FitchRatings, supra note 7, at 8, 9. 
 83. See infra notes 123-130 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Investors in Subprime Offerings Benefit from Conservative Risk 
Assessments by Rating Agencies 
Individuals and entities who purchase bonds in subprime RMBS 
offerings can benefit from rating agencies’ tendency to overestimate credit 
risk.  As securities trade on the secondary market, the rating agencies 
reevaluate the performance of the underlying collateral in the securitized 
loan pools and upgrade or downgrade the affected tranches as needed.  If 
the rating model is accurate and there are no unanticipated credit shocks, 
tranches should keep their original grades.  If the rating agency later 
upgrades a tranche in response to information on collateral performance, its 
original credit risk assessment was too conservative.  If it later downgrades 
a tranche due to poor loan performance, its initial assessment was too 
sanguine. 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) reports for 2003 through 2006 expressly tout 
data that S&P tends to overestimate the credit risk of senior subprime 
tranches.  As the chart on the following page shows, S&P upgrades 
outpaced downgrades in public subprime home loan securitizations through 
2005, and downgrades in the senior subprime tranches were almost 
nonexistent through 2005 and rare in 2006.84
Two aspects of these data are noteworthy.  First, until 2006, upgrades 
outnumbered downgrades.  In 2003, for instance, S&P issued almost 2.5 
upgrades for every subprime RMBS downgrade (111 upgrades to 46 
downgrades).  In 2004, this ratio widened, and it widened again in 2005.  In 
2004, S&P issued 4.22 upgrades for every subprime downgrade (152 
upgrades to 36 downgrades); in 2005, there were 4.6 subprime upgrades for 
every subprime downgrade (235 upgrades to 51 downgrades).  This data 
reveals that, at least through 2005, when S&P made errors, its errors were 
skewed toward excessive caution. 
Second, the senior tranches are the main beneficiaries of S&P’s 
excessively conservative ratings of subprime RMBS.  Subprime securities 
rated A+ or higher had numerous upgrades (70 in 2003, 90 in 2004, 117 in 
 84. In fact, in 2006, the vast majority (98.5%) of public and private tranches combined 
rated by S&P either kept their ratings or received upgrades. S&P, Transition Study:  U.S. 
RMBS Upgrades Are Down and Downgrades Are Up in 2006 (2007).  The 1.5 percent of 
tranches that received S&P downgrades were probably a reflection of the fact that toward the 
end of 2005, mortgage loan delinquency rates began rising. Al Yoon, Housing Bubble Bursts 
in U.S. Mortgage Bond Market (Update 2), Bloomberg.com, Dec. 6, 2005, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aDSB370ItSJU&refer=us. 
Indeed, S&P’s slow response to the inherent risk in subprime securitizations caused 
Gretchen Morgenson of The New York Times to lament, “It’s amazing how long it can take 
investors to see that the wheels are coming off a prized investment vehicle.  Denial, after all, 
is a powerful thing.” Gretchen Morgenson, Will Other Mortgage Dominoes Fall?, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2007, at C1. 
We compiled our data from S&P, supra note 42, app. 2 (2004); S&P, Rating Transitions 
2004:  U.S. RMBS Stellar Performance Continues to Set Records, app. 2 (2005) [hereinafter 
S&P, Rating Transitions 2004]; S&P, Rating Transitions 2005:  U.S. RMBS Volume and 
Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, apps. 1-2 (2006); S&P, Transition Study: U.S. 
RMBS Upgrades Are Down and Downgrades Are Up in 2006, apps 1-2 (2007). 
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2005, and 57 in 2006).  Conversely, only one of the senior classes rated A+ 
or higher in 2003 through 2005 suffered a downgrade, despite rising 
subprime loan default rates.  In 2006, this figure rose to thirteen; upgrades 
of those classes still outnumbered downgrades by more than four to one. As 
one subprime lender declared, “If you buy the Triple-A, you’re home 
free.”85




Rating AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC D
2003 
Upgrades
0 16 47 2 5 28 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 
Downgrades
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 5 1 7 0 6 0 3 5 10 3 0
2004 
Upgrades
0 9 77 1 3 36 0 1 13 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2004 
Downgrades
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 4 1 5 0 8 0 0 9 0 3 0
2005 
Upgrades
0 21 85 4 7 54 11 16 24 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005 
Downgrades
0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 11 7 2 10 0 8 0 0 8 0 0 0
2006 
Upgrades
0 13 37 3 4 19 7 8 8 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006 
Downgrades
2 1 5 3 2 14 3 11 43 55 4 32 10 24 1 0 11 0 0 0
 
This rosy upgrade experience serves two important marketing functions.  
First, it allays investors’ concerns about lemon loans.  Second, it entices 
potential investors to purchase senior subprime tranches by holding out the 
possibility that investors will enjoy upgrades over time.86  This upgrade 
experience, plus a structure that enables senior bonds to mature quickly, 
helps explain the remarkable growth in subprime RMBS.87
C.  Diversification 
Diversification is another means by which securitization reduces 
investors’ risk, including the risk of “lemon” loans.  Because there is high 
 
 85. H&R Block, Inc. at UBS Global Financial Services Conference—F, FD (Fair 
Disclosure) Wire, May 10, 2005. 
 86. The larger significance of S&P’s upgrade/downgrade data for subprime loan pools is 
uncertain because S&P does not always report the total number of subprime tranches whose 
ratings remained unchanged.  Some sense of the magnitude can be gleaned from S&P 
reports, however, that 91.45% of all 17,674 RMBS tranches (including prime and subprime) 
rated in 2004 maintained the same credit rating a year later, while only 0.82% suffered 
downgrades and 7.73% experienced upgrades. See supra note 84. 
 87. An empirical study of Freddie Mac multi-class RMBS recently reached the same 
conclusion, finding that “the capital structures of multi-class MBS” evolved as a solution to 
the lemons problem. Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra note 54, at 20. 
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investor demand for subprime RMBS, lenders can securitize large pools of 
subprime loans.  In turn, large loan pools enable investors to better diversify 
risk.  The greater the diversity in the loan pool in terms of geography, credit 
risk, prepayment risk, and legal risk, the less likely it is that investors will 
suffer losses.88
D.  Pricing 
Because of the lemons problem, investors in RMBS demand a risk 
premium, in the form of a price reduction, to compensate them for the risk 
of adverse selection.  To some extent, investment banks seek to reduce this 
risk premium by refining their pricing models to calibrate risks more 
accurately.  Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that the prices for 
RMBS still contain lemons premia.89
In response, lenders who securitize their loans extract price concessions 
from subprime borrowers in the form of excessive interest rates, 
prepayment penalties, and other loan terms.  In 2004 and 2005, for instance, 
rating agencies demanded costlier protections for investors in subprime 
RMBS, prompting subprime lenders to raise the interest rates on their loans 
in response.90  This evidence is consistent with findings that securitization 
can push up home mortgage rates.91
Studies of securitized subprime loans have found evidence of 
overpricing.  Freddie Mac researchers have concluded, for example, that 
 88. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 15, at 1088. 
 89. See Wayne Passmore & Roger Sparks, Putting the Squeeze on a Market for Lemons:  
Government-Sponsored Mortgage Securitization, 13 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 27 (1996); 
Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra note 54, at 4, 21 (finding that Freddie Mac faced a 
“lemons discount” on the sale of multi-class RMBS).   
 90. See Erick Bergquist, Block Quits Subprime Price Fight, Am. Banker, Sept. 6, 2005, 
at 1 (reporting that H&R Block’s subprime lender, Option One, raised its interest rates on its 
home loans by forty basis points because the rating agencies were “demanding more costly 
protection for investors”); Ed Jones, Getting into Nonprime Lending Is No Problem with 
New Technology, Secondary Marketing Executive, Oct. 2004, at 40 (“Major investors can 
control both the base and incremental pricing they provide to various [subprime] lenders 
around the country.”); Allison Pyburn, Home Equity Sub Spreads Finally Show Signs of 
Widening, Asset Securitization Rep., July 4, 2005; Howard Schneider, Versatility for Long-
Term Success, Nat’l Mortgage Broker Mag., Feb. 2006, available at 
http://www.nationalmortgagebroker.com (“[subprime] investors now are demanding higher 
yields to compensate for increased risks.  Worries about future delinquencies ha[ve] 
investors pushing prices down on mortgage-backed bonds, causing yields to go up on 
mortgages made to consumers with low FICO scores.”); National City at Goldman Sachs 
Financial Services CEO Conference 2005—F, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, Dec. 6, 2005 
(acknowledging “the pressure on gain on sale coming from the capital markets”); Q1 2006 
H&R Block, Inc. Earnings Conference Call—F, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, Sept. 1, 2005 
(defending the price hike because, given subprime credit risks, “investors[] ought to be paid 
more for it”). 
 91. See Andrea Heuson, Wayne Passmore & Rogers Sparks, Credit Scoring and 
Mortgage Securitization:  Implications for Mortgage Rates and Credit Availability, 23 J. 
Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 337, 347-53 (2001); Passmore & Sparks, supra note 89; Steven Todd, 
The Effects of Securitization on Consumer Mortgage Costs, 29 Real Est. Econ. 29 (2001); 
Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra note 54, at 4-5, 21. 
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subprime lenders steered unwitting customers who qualified for prime loans 
into subprime products, forcing those customers to overpay for credit.92  
Another Freddie Mac study examined the question whether subprime loans 
properly price borrowers’ risk by comparing the interest rates of prime and 
subprime (specifically A-) loans securitized by Freddie Mac.  After holding 
credit risk constant, the study concluded that “roughly one-half of the 
interest rate premium paid by subprime borrowers—100 basis points—
cannot easily be explained by the higher levels of risk associated with these 
types of loans.”93  The study made no “attempt to account for or measure 
the higher average origination points and fees paid by subprime 
borrowers.”94  In the authors’ view, the “total prices charged to subprime 
borrowers (rates, points, and fees) are . . . likely in excess of the amounts 
that can be justified by their differentially higher credit risk.”95
A new body of research reveals that prepayment penalties similarly push 
the cost of subprime loans above their risk-adjusted price.  Prepayment 
penalties are common in subprime loans, while prime loans almost never 
 92. For example, in 1996, Freddie Mac found that ten to thirty-five percent of subprime 
borrowers could have qualified for prime-rate loans. Freddie Mac, supra note 18, ch. 5 & 
nn.5-6; Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, The Best Value in the Subprime Market:  State Predatory 
Lending Reforms 8 (2006) (finding that fourteen percent of subprime borrowers studied 
between 1998 and 2004 were prime-eligible); Lax et al., supra note 19, at 565 (finding that 
“some borrowers end up with subprime loans for reasons other than risk” and calling that 
finding “disturbing”).  Fannie Mae’s former President Franklin Raines similarly stated that 
up to half of all subprime mortgages are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae under its prime 
loan guidelines. See HUD’s Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. 
Reg. 65,044, 65,053 (Oct. 31, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81); see also Darryl E. 
Getter, Consumer Credit Risk and Pricing, 40 J. Consumer Aff. 41, 49-50 (2006) (finding 
that 36.4 percent of households paying the costliest interest rates on home mortgage “were of 
high credit quality”); Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Profiting from Fine Print with 
Wall Street’s Help, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2000, at A1. 
 93. Lax et al., supra note 19, at 569. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 569; accord Li & Ernst, supra note 92, at 15 (finding that nominal interest 
rates on subprime loans in states without strong anti-predatory lending laws were twenty-five 
basis points higher on average than on comparable loans in states with strong state laws). 
Lax and his colleagues discussed a persistent price discontinuity on the order of 200-plus 
basis points separating A and A- loans, only part of which could be explained by risk. See 
Lax et al., supra note 19, at 567-68.  For discussion of the significance of this price 
discontinuity, see White, supra note 19, at 512-13.   The finance literature is riddled with the 
fallacy that securitization reduces the price borrowers pay for credit by lowering the lender’s 
cost of funds. See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 43, at 2; Thomas E. Plank, The Security of 
Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1655, 1668 (2004); Michael 
H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 J. 
Marshall L. Rev. 269, 280 (1999); Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 136; Joseph C. Shenker & 
Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:  Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 
Tex. L. Rev. 1369, 1379-81 (1991).  The high transaction costs of securitization are hard to 
square with assertions of cost savings. See Iacobucci & Winter, supra note 15, at 168; 
Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 139-42.  Even if there were cost savings, that assumes that the 
savings are passed on to borrowers.  Finally, the cost savings theory fails to take account of 
the fact that investors demand compensation for the lemons problem. 
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carry such penalties.96  Industry representatives defend prepayment 
penalties by arguing that subprime prepayment speeds are faster than 
prime.97  However, there is “sparse” empirical data from the industry to 
support that claim, and what there is consists only of summary statistics.98  
In contrast, recent multivariate regression analyses have found that 
prepayment speeds of high-risk borrowers are the same as or slower than 
speeds of low-risk borrowers.99  Two of those studies found that slower 
prepayment speeds made subprime loans relatively more profitable than 
 96. Prepayment penalties can stay in force for up to five years and commonly consist of 
six months of interest on the amount prepaid less twenty percent. See Anand K. 
Bhattacharya, Prepayment Penalty Mortgage-Backed Securities, in The Handbook of 
Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 62, at 75, 77-78.     Studies have determined that 
anywhere from fifty-one to ninety-eight percent of subprime mortgages carry prepayment 
penalties, depending on the time period studied.  In comparison, prepayment penalties are 
found in less than two percent of prime mortgages. See Li & Ernst, supra note 92, at 8, 12;  
Treasury-HUD Report, supra note 20, at 93; Joshua Brockman, Fannie Revamps 
Prepayment-Penalty Bonds, Am. Banker, July 20, 1999, at 16. 
 97. See, e.g., Weicher, supra note 56, at 69; McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 141-42;  
see also Treasury-HUD Report, supra note 20, at 28. 
 98. Anthony Pennington-Cross, Credit History and the Performance of Prime and 
Nonprime Mortgages, 27 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 279 (2003); see also Wayne R. Archer et 
al., Household Income, Termination Risk and Mortgage Pricing, 27 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 
111, 135 n.1 (2003). 
 99. See Archer et al., supra note 98 (finding no significant difference between 
prepayment speeds of low-income and more affluent households; also finding that higher 
loan-to-value ratios substantially slowed prepayment speeds for low-income households); 
Pennington-Cross, supra note 98, at 280-81, 289-94, 296-97, 300 (concluding that 
prepayment speeds dropped as credit scores dropped and that average A- prepayment speeds 
were slower than prime prepayment speeds for borrowers with FICO scores under 700); 
Robert Van Order & Peter Zorn, Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages 23 
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. LIHO-01.10, 2001) 
(concluding that black and Hispanic borrowers had significantly slower prepayment rates 
than whites, even after controlling for FICO scores and loan-to-value ratios); Yongheng 
Deng & Stuart Gabriel, Risk-Based Pricing and the Enhancement of Mortgage Credit 
Availability Among Underserved and Higher Credit-Risk Populations 11, 13-14, 17-19, 32 
tbl.1 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (finding 
that lower FICO scores, high loan-to-value ratios, and being black, Hispanic, or a single 
female were predictors of lower prepayment speeds); see also Davidson et al., supra note 36, 
at 330-31; Ivan Gjaja, Prepayments on RFC Fixed-Rate Subprime/HELs, in Salomon Smith 
Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 40, at 519, 537; 
Infovest 21 LLC, Strategy Focus:  Multi-Strategy Fixed Income (July 1, 2005) (noting that 
for mortgage derivatives, “agency derivatives [i.e., issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] 
have more prepayment risk” than private label RMBS); Harris Nesbitt, Asset-Backed Update 
6 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/transaction/Nesbitt29Apr05.pdf 
(noting that fast prepayments decrease excess spread, “making the transaction much more 
sensitive to spikes in losses or deterioration in general performance”); Lakhbir Hayre & 
Robert Young, Anatomy of Prepayments:  The Salomon Smith Barney Prepayment Model, in 
Salomon Smith Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 
40, at 131, 161-62; Hurst, supra note 62, at 292 (explaining that “prepayment of [subprime 
home loans] has proved to be much more stable than that of the [prime] MBS market and has 
resulted in securitization with less negative convexity”).  Industry data also suggest that the 
newest subprime product, interest-only adjustable rate mortgages, “prepay more slowly than 
regular amortizing ARMs.” Banc of Am. Sec., ABS Research Note:  2005 Outlook:  
Cautiously Optimistic 15-16 (2005); see also Neil J. Morse, The Interest-Only Craze, 
Mortgage Banking, Oct. 2004, at 52. 
~9555358 3/19/2007  3:20 PM 
122 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
prime loans, even after controlling for differences in credit risk.100  
Conversely, in some interest-rate environments when credit risk is rapidly 
rising, faster subprime prepayment speeds can actually boost subprime 
profits.  In the summer of 2005, for example, S&P lauded faster subprime 
prepayment speeds for “driving superior [subprime] performance.”  
According to S&P, “[e]xtended deals may lead to greater losses” due to 
heightened risk of foreclosure.101
Subprime lenders also contend that prepayment penalties represent a 
trade-off for lower interest rates.  If this were true, one would expect 
subprime borrowers with prepayment penalties to pay lower interest rates 
than comparable subprime borrowers without.  This is not the case.  A 
recent study found that prepayment penalties had little or no downward 
effect on interest rates on subprime refinance loans after controlling for 
property location, loan terms, and underwriting factors based on borrowers’ 
characteristics.  For subprime home purchase loans, prepayment penalties 
went hand-in-hand with higher interest rates after controlling for geography 
and credit risk.102  Originators have incentives to charge higher interest 
rates and prepayment penalties because these terms generate higher prices 
when the loans are sold or packaged for securitization. 
To summarize, the lemons problem causes investors in senior tranches of 
subprime RMBS to pressure lenders to impose excess costs on borrowers.  
Lenders respond to this pressure by charging borrowers higher interest rates 
and fees and adding onerous loan terms, such as prepayment penalties. 
E.  Due Diligence 
Due diligence is another technique that lenders, underwriters, rating 
agencies, and institutional purchasers of subprime RMBS use to manage 
risk.  However, to the extent these entities engage in any due diligence, it is 
limited in scope.  “[I]n the past, Wall Street . . . hoped [investors] could 
purchase originated assets without having to do much [due] diligence on the 
origination side.”103  Largely, that was because investors depended on the 
 100. Deng & Gabriel, supra note 99, at 20; see id. at 5, 22; see also Van Order & Zorn, 
supra note 99, at 27 (concluding that for low-income and minority borrowers, “the lower 
costs from exercising the prepayment option have at least offset these [default costs] for our 
loan sample”). 
 101. See S&P, supra note 31, at 35; see also id. at 13, 45, 51; accord Banc of Am. Sec., 
supra note 99, at 2.  In such environments, prepayment penalties can operate to increase 
default risk by slowing down prepayment speeds. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 
4, at 7. 
 102. Keith S. Ernst, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Borrowers Gain No Interest Rate 
Benefits from Prepayment Penalties on Subprime Mortgages (January 2005), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr05-PPP_Interest_Rate-0105.pdf. But see Michael 
LaCour-Little, Call Protection in Mortgage Contracts 2-27 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the Fordham Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=881618 (in a 
study of loans made by one subprime lender, finding that prepayment penalties were 
correlated with a reduction in the interest rate). 
 103. Dona DeZube, Predatory Pandemonium, Mortgage Banking, Apr. 2003, at 26, 32; 
see also Richard Beidl, A Balancing Act; eMortgage, Mortgage Banking, Apr. 2003, at 95. 
~9555358 3/19/2007  3:20 PM 
2007] TURNING A BLIND EYE 123 
 
senior-subordinate structure, not due diligence, to protect them from credit 
risk.104
In recent years, three developments have prompted some investment 
banks, loan aggregators,105 and investors to intensify their due diligence on 
subprime RMBS.  First, in June 2003, a federal jury issued a $50.9 million 
verdict against Lehman Brothers for aiding and abetting First Alliance 
Mortgage Corp. (popularly known as “FAMCO”) in defrauding subprime 
borrowers.106  The verdict sent shock waves throughout the securitization 
world because Lehman Brothers was found liable in part, as FAMCO’s 
investment bank and warehouse lender, for faulty due diligence on 
FAMCO’s securitized loans.107  Second, some states, including Georgia, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New Mexico, enacted new anti-predatory 
lending laws that hold assignees of subprime loans, who fail to conduct 
adequate due diligence to exclude high-cost loans from securitization pools, 
liable for loan originators’ predatory practices.108  Finally, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have started buying the better subprime loans and their higher 
due diligence requirements have forced loan originators to do more due 
diligence of their own.109  As we will discuss in Part VI.C below, the extent 
and nature of this due diligence varies widely. 
F.  Deal Provisions 
Secondary market purchasers also demand contractual protections to 
mitigate the lemons problem.110  These contractual provisions are designed 
to shift part or all of the credit risk back onto lenders.  The rating agencies 
 104. See Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 38. 
 105. See infra Part VI.A. 
 106. See Erick Bergquist, Experts Say Lehman Case Is Warning, Not Precedent, Am. 
Banker, June 18, 2003, at 6. 
 107. Cf. Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 659-65 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (findings of fact).  Lehman Brothers allegedly learned of FAMCO’s 
fraud during due diligence and nevertheless gave FAMCO “substantial assistance” in 
financing FAMCO’s operations through securitization. See Anand S. Raman et al., Cutting 
the Risks Built into Third-Party Lending Relationships, ABA Banking J., July 2003, at 61.  
More generally, Professor Christopher Peterson would impose imputed liability on 
investment banks that structure predatory securitizations. See Christopher L. Peterson, 
Predatory Structured Finance (Sept. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Fordham Law Review), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929118. 
 108. See infra notes 243-260 and accompanying text. 
 109. Neil J. Morse, Not Exactly Prime, Mortgage Banking, June 2003, at 60 [hereinafter 
Morse, Not Exactly Prime]; Neil J. Morse, The Compliance Battle, Mortgage Banking, Sept. 
2003, at 28 [hereinafter Morse, The Compliance Battle]; see also U.S. Gen. Accounting 
Office (GAO), GAO-04-280, Consumer Protection:  Federal and State Agencies Face 
Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending 79-81 (2004).  For discussion of Fannie Mae’s 
and Freddie Mac’s due diligence standards for A- mortgages, see infra notes 266-267 and 
accompanying text. 
 110. See generally Karen B. Gelernt, Comment:  Avoiding Predator Risk in the Secondary 
Market, Am. Banker, July 7, 2000, at 9 (recommending contractual protections that investors 
should demand when assessing offerings and originators). 
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consistently laud these and other provisions as effectively insulating 
investors from the risk of lemon loans.  As one Fitch representative stated 
in 2004, “‘Issuers have provided protective measures to significantly reduce 
transaction risk and investor assignee liability from predatory lending.’”111
1.  Representations and Warranties 
Lenders provide representations and warranties to investors in subprime 
deals.112  Some of these provisions are specifically designed to guard 
against the credit risk and litigation risk of predatory loans.  Thus, rating 
agencies, underwriters, and investors insist that lenders warrant that all 
loans in the loan pool comply with applicable laws, including consumer 
protection laws.113  Sometimes lenders also must provide representations 
and warranties that all loan applicants’ reported salaries fall within a 
reasonable range of salaries for their specific profession and locale.114
2.  Recourse and Collateral Substitution Clauses 
Similarly, investment banks and rating agencies may insist on recourse 
clauses that require lenders to take back loans if specific events occur.115  
Events that can trigger recourse clauses include borrower default116 or 
evidence that the loans contain prohibited terms.117  Similarly, collateral 
substitution clauses require lenders to substitute performing loans for loans 
that go into default.  Recourse clauses and collateral substitution clauses are 
 111. Patrick Crowley, Report Says Predatory Lending Issues Mostly Resolved for RMBS 
Issuers, Servicers, Mortgage Daily, Jan. 5, 2004 (quoting Tom Albertson, Senior Dir., Fitch 
Ratings), available at http://www.mortgagedaily.com/RatingsSubprime010504.asp; cf. 
Moody’s Investor Service, Predatory Lending and Home Equity Securitizations 1 (Apr. 28, 
2000) (stating that allegations of predatory lending were unlikely to “have a widespread 
negative effect on the credit quality of outstanding securitizations . . . because many 
securitizations of subprime mortgage loans are fully insured by a monoline bond insurer”). 
 112. This occurs more often in public offerings than in Rule 144A private placements. 
See Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 28, 31; infra notes 162-165 and accompanying text. 
 113. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (June 2004); Citigroup 
Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613 (Sept. 2001) (Banamex); Citigroup Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 
(Sept. 2001) (EAB); Chase Manhattan Corp., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 76 (Feb. 2001); S&P, supra 
note 31, at 32;  Morse, The Compliance Battle, supra note 109. 
 114. See Jody Shenn, How Lenders Cut Risk on Low-Doc Loans, Am. Banker, Oct. 26, 
2004, at 6m. 
 115. See S&P, supra note 31, at 33; Eggert, supra note 2, at 541-42, 548; Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The Limits Of Lawyering:  Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 
1, 3, 4 n.12 (2005).  Not all subprime securitizations include recourse provisions.  As of 
September 2005, for instance, Option One’s secondary market resales of subprime home 
loans were made exclusively on a nonrecourse basis. See Q1 2006 H&R Block, Inc. Earnings 
Conference Call, supra note 90. 
 116. See Michaud, supra note 37, at 272.  In a parallel phenomenon in response to the 
issuance of the FTC Rule, lenders began insisting that merchants agree to recourse 
provisions obligating the merchants to purchase notes from the lenders if the borrowers were 
“dissatisfied.” Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course:  Codification and the Victory of Form 
over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 363, 430 (2002). 
 117. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 527. 
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meant to redress the lemons problem118 by making lenders internalize the 
risk of loans that go into default or that violate the law. 
3.  Requiring Lenders to Retain Servicing Rights 
Some securitization deals require lenders to retain loan servicing rights.  
Doing so gives lenders incentives to maximize creditworthiness because 
servicing costs go up as default risk rises.119  A lender who securitizes its 
loans but retains the servicing rights has a direct stake in timely repayment, 
because collection becomes costly when loans become delinquent or go into 
default.  Thus, when lenders retain the servicing rights, they have incentives 
to hold down credit risk when making loans. 
G.  Credit-Default Swaps 
Wall Street has created a new type of derivative that provides added 
protection to investors from the credit risk associated with abusive lending.  
This derivative, called a “credit-default swap,” functions like an insurance 
policy and pays off investors when default rates in a loan pool exceed a 
specified level.120  These derivatives enable investors to purchase securities 
backed by predatory loans and then hedge against potential losses if 
borrowers are unable to repay the loans. 
VI.  WHY PREDATORY LENDING PERSISTS DESPITE RISK MANAGEMENT 
The mechanisms that protect investors from risk should also exert 
discipline on subprime lenders by forcing them to retain some of the risk 
associated with the loan pools.  All of these measures are designed to give 
lenders incentives to make good loans and thereby cut default risk.  
Nevertheless, none of these measures, singly or together, has curbed 
abusive lending.121  In this section, we explain why predatory lending 
persists despite attempts at market discipline by the secondary market. 
 118. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 3, 24.  
 119. See Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology:  Smart 
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 4-5 (Harvard Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working 
Paper BABC 04-19, 2004). 
 120. Mark Whitehouse, As Home Owners Face Strains, Market Bets on Loan Defaults, 
Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 2006, at A1. 
 121. A 2004 report by The Reinvestment Fund documented the incidence of predatory 
lending in home loan refinance transactions. See The Reinvestment Fund, Predatory 
Lending:  An Approach to Identify and Understand Predatory Lending (2004), available at 
http://www.trfund.com/policy/predatory.lending.htm; see also Quercia, Stegman & Davis, 
supra note 4.  Between 1998 and 2005, the Federal Trade Commission prosecuted predatory 
lending cases against home mortgage lenders and brokers including Action Loan Co., Amor 
Mortgage, Abacus Mortgage, Associates First Capital Corp., Barry Cooper Properties, 
Capital City Mortgage Corp., Capitol Mortgage Corp., Chase Financial Funding, Inc., CLS 
Financial Services, Inc., Delta Funding Corp., Fairbanks Capital Corp., First Alliance 
Mortgage Company, First Plus Financial Group, Inc., Fleet Finance and Home Equity 
U.S.A., Granite Mortgage, LLC, Interstate Resource Corp., LAP Financial Services, Inc., 
Mark Diamond, Mercantile Mortgage Co., Nationwide Mortgage Corp., NuWest, Inc., PWR 
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Processing, Inc., R.A. Walker & Assocs., and Wasatch Credit Corp. See Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Efforts to Combat 
Unfair and Deceptive Subprime Lending Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 3-8, 
Feb. 24, 2004, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2004/02/02242004subprimelendingtest.pdf;  
Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Sandra F. Braunstein, Dir., Fed. 
Reserve Sys. Div. of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs (Feb. 23, 2005), available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050301enforcemntrpt.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Capital City Mortgage Corp. Defendant Settles with FTC (May 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/05/sanne.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Capital City 
Mortgage Settles FTC Charges (Feb. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/capitalcity.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC 
Challenges Bogus Mortgage Loan Brokers (June 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/pwrprocessing.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
FTC, DOJ and HUD Announce Action to Combat Abusive Lending Practices, (Mar. 30, 
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/03/deltafunding.htm; Press Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, FTC:  Mortgage Broker’s Deceptive Claims Tricked Consumers Looking 
for a Good Rate (June 2, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/ 
chasefinancial.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Home Equity Lenders Settle 
Charges that They Engaged in Abusive Lending Practices; Over Half Million Dollars To Be 
Returned to Consumers (July 29, 1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/07/hoepa.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,  Home 
Mortgage Lender Settles “Predatory Lending” Charges (Mar. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/famco.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Midwest 
Mortgage Lender Agrees to Settle Illegal Lending Charges Brought by FTC, HUD, and State 
of Illinois, (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/ 
mercantilediamond.htm; Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Subprime Lending Cases (since 1998), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/subprimelendingcases.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).   
In April 2004, the Office of Thrift Supervision entered into a supervisory agreement with 
Ocwen Federal Bank designed to eliminate alleged predatory loan servicing practices. 
Supervisory Agreement, Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB and Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS 
Docket No. 04592 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/9/93606.pdf.  
The following month, Citigroup Inc. and its subprime mortgage subsidiary, Citifinancial 
Credit Company, agreed to a cease-and-desist order in which the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System imposed a $70 million civil money penalty for alleged predatory 
lending practices. Timothy L. O’Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan 
Abuse, N.Y. Times, May 28, 2004, at C1; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. (May 27, 2004), available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
press/enforcement/2004/20040527/default.htm.  The 2004 Citigroup order followed on the 
heels of an earlier $215 million settlement by Citigroup Inc. in 2002 to resolve FTC charges 
of predatory lending. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Citigroup Settles FTC Charges 
Against the Associates Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept. 
19, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.htm.   
In 2005, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency similarly issued agency sanctions 
against Chicago Title Insurance Company for fraudulent home loan settlement practices. See 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Stipulation and Consent Order, In re Chicago 
Title Ins. Co., #2005-12 (Feb. 24, 2005), available at www.occ.treas.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2005-
12.pdf.  Finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has pursued mortgage fraud 
aggressively. See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Chris Swecker Before the 
House Finan. Services Subcomm. On Housing and Community Opportunity (Oct. 7, 2004), 
available at www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/swecker100704.htm; Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, Financial Crimes Report to the Public (May 2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report052005/fcs_report052005.htm (reporting 
on investigations into equity skimming, property flipping and mortgage-related identity 
theft).  In 2006, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia reached a $325 million 
settlement with Ameriquest Mortgage Company over alleged predatory lending practices. 
See, e.g., Press Release, Iowa Dep’t of Justice, Miller:  Ameriquest Will Pay $325 Million 
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A.  The Unholy Alliance of Marginal Lenders and Loan Aggregators 
Increasingly, subprime lenders are selling whole loans to outside loan 
aggregators, who bundle and securitize them.  Generally, such aggregators 
are affiliates of Wall Street investment banks.  Major players include Credit 
Suisse First Boston, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Bear, Stearns & 
Co., Merrill Lynch, Greenwich Capital, UBS, Bank of America, and 
Deutsche Bank Securities.122
Subprime aggregation is popular because it offers advantages to both 
investment banks and lenders.  These advantages are particularly strong for 
small or poorly-capitalized lenders.  Aggregation permits these lenders to 
sell loan pools for securitization that would otherwise be too small to 
provide diversification.  More importantly, aggregation enables marginal 
lenders to obtain financing despite obscure or questionable reputations by 
“renting” the aggregator’s reputation for quality securities. 
Wall Street prizes aggregation because it helps boost investment banks’ 
underwriting business and helps them assemble diversified loan pools.  
Furthermore, it allows investment banks to enjoy subprime profits with 
reduced legal risk, assuming that the aggregators qualify as holders-in-due 
course and do not participate in underwriting loans.  Because they have 
minimal exposure to suits, aggregators have reduced incentives to guard 
against abusive practices. 
B.  Lenders Do Not Always Retain an Interest in the Subordinated Tranches 
In the process of providing credit enhancements, the lender (through an 
affiliate) often buys securities in the subordinated tranches, which are rated 
double- or single-B or are simply unrated.123  While this makes it appear 
and Reform its Lending Practices (Jan. 23, 2006), available at  
http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/jan_2006/Ameriquest_Iowa.html. 
 122. Loan aggregation is also known as warehouse lending, conduit lending, or “principal 
finance.”  The aggregation business has boomed, accounting for 42% of subprime 
securitizations in 2002. See Morse, Not Exactly Prime, supra note 109; Shepherd, supra note 
29; Bonnie Sinnock, Morgan Stanley Sees Technology as Key to ‘Strong Credit Culture’, 
Nat’l Mortgage News, Mar. 28, 2005, at 3. 
 123. See Jody Shenn, Where’s Mortgage Risk?  New Answers Emerging, Am. Banker, 
May 11, 2005, at 1.  Subordinated tranches comprised only a small fraction of the 
proceeds—no more than fifteen percent—from all RMBS tranches rated by S&P through 
2004 (including subprime tranches).  Investment-grade tranches (rated BBB or higher and 
bought by outside investors) accounted for the remaining eighty-five percent. See S&P, 
Rating Transitions 2004, supra note 84, at 5 tbl.4; see also Blum & DiAngelo, supra note 
33, at 253; Frank L. Raiter, Risk-Based Pricing Nonagency Mortgages and Securities, in 
Subprime Consumer Lending 145, 151 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1999).  Subprime RMBS are 
often issued through limited offerings or private placements.  Under the Securities Act of 
1933 and Securities & Exchange Commission regulations, few private individuals qualify to 
buy investment-grade subprime RMBS through unregistered offerings. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 
230.501-230.508 (2006).  Instead, institutional investors (banks and thrifts, insurance 
companies, pension funds, mutual funds and, to a minor degree, hedge funds) plus foreign 
entities buy the vast majority of those securities. See Hayre, supra note 40, at 11-12; Ruth 
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that the lender retains the riskiest securities, this is not necessarily the case.  
Instead, outside investors buy many of these so-called “residuals,” some at 
the time of offering and others through later secondary market re-sales.124  
There is strong demand by outside investors (principally real estate 
investment trusts, hedge funds, and overseas investors) for the double- and 
single-B subprime tranches.125  In addition, lenders can resell their 
subprime residuals to outside investors through bonds known as 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).  Essentially, CDOs securitize 
residuals from RMBS and other assets.126  Significantly, U.S. subprime 
Simon et al., Housing-Bubble Talk Doesn’t Scare Off Foreigners, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 2005, 
at A1; Infovest21 LLC, supra note 99. 
 124. For lenders who are regulated depository institutions or their operating subsidiaries, 
regulatory accounting principles may compel the sale of the double- or single-B tranches. 
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 15, at 1069-70 & n.36, 1089 & n.131.  Even when lenders retain 
subprime residuals, they can mitigate their credit risk through conventional mortgage 
insurance on the underlying mortgages or credit-default swaps that hedge the risk. See, e.g., 
Countrywide Financial Corporation Analyst Meeting—Final, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, 
May 24, 2005 (explaining that “one of the ways that we get down to a lower, net residual 
position on the sub prime is due to use of mortgage insurance”); Simon & Hagerty, supra 
note 49, at C1.  Additionally, the persistence of predatory lending despite retained residuals 
may suggest that predatory lending is so profitable—largely due to up-front fees and 
proceeds from securitization—that those profits generally offset the financial risks of 
holding the residuals. 
 125. See James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Mortgage Risk:  A Hot Export, Wall St. J., 
Sept. 22, 2005, at C1, C4; Iacobucci & Winter, supra note 15, at 188-89; Sarah Mulholland, 
Single-B HEL Classes Emerge:  Yield-Hungry Buyers Driving Trend, Asset Securitization 
Rep., Aug. 9, 2004; Simon et al., supra note 123; see also Countrywide Financial 
Corporation Analyst Meeting, supra note 124 (observing that the “ability to sell residuals or 
the bottom pieces in the credit .  . . spectrum whether it [is] double digits or single digits . . . 
has been substantially broadened in the last few years as a number of investors have reached 
down the credit curve for a greater yield”); Kevin Donovan, Large HEL ABS Beefs Up 
Otherwise Slow U.S. ABS Market, Asset Securitization Rep., Feb. 2, 2004, (describing a 
home equity securitization with single-B plus rated bonds and noting “the strong demand for 
mezzanine and sub classes”). 
 126. As such, the CDO market provides liquidity for RMBS, including subprime 
securities.  “Through retranching and diversification, CDOs produce higher-rated securities 
from lower-rated ones.” Shenn, supra note 123, at 1, 10.  For helpful introductions to CDOs, 
see Olivier Cousseran & Imène Rahmouni, The CDO Market:  Functioning and Implications 
in Terms of Financial Stability, 6 Fin. Stability Rev. 43, 44 (2005), and S&P, Global Cash 
Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria 4-13 (2002) [hereinafter S&P, Global Cash Flow and 
Synthetic CDO Criteria].  The authors are indebted to Kevin Byers for his insights on CDOs 
and NIMS.  A typical CDO might contain subprime RMBS with a weighted average rating 
as low as BB+, meaning that many of those securities are rated below investment grade. See, 
e.g., Fitch Rates Duke Funding VIII, Ltd./Corp ‘AAA/AA/A-/BBB,’ Bus. Wire, Apr. 5, 
2005; Fitch Rates Glacier Funding CDO II, Ltd ‘AAA/AAA/AA/BBB/BB,’ Bus. Wire, Oct. 
12, 2004; Fitch Rates G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd./Corp., Bus. Wire, Mar. 16, 2005; Fitch Rates 
Newcastle CDO VI, Ltd. ‘F1+/AAA/AAA/AA/A/BBB,’ Bus. Wire, Apr. 19, 2005; Fitch 
Rates Northwall Funding CDO I, Ltd./Inc., Bus. Wire, May 17, 2005; Fitch Rates Sorin Real 
Estate CDO I, Ltd., Bus. Wire, July 21, 2005; G-STAR 2004-4 Rated ‘AAA/AA/A-/BBB’ 
by Fitch Ratings, Bus. Wire, Aug. 12, 2004; see also Allison Pyburn, Merrill finds less risk 
in CDO Collateral Versus HEL ABS Market, Asset Securitization Rep., Aug. 8, 2005 (noting 
that “CDOs highly exposed to subordinate [subprime] ABS bonds”); Shenn, supra 123, at 1.  
One S&P study of CDOs found that the weighted average rating of subprime RMBS backing 
CDOs dropped from A in 2003 to BBB in 2004. See S&P, CDO Spotlight:  U.S. CDO of 
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RMBS have comprised the single “largest collateral asset class in [CDOs] 
since the inception of the product in 1999.”127
A central purpose of residuals is to force lenders to retain the bulk of the 
credit risk they create.128  However, when lenders with subprime residuals 
shift them off their books through CDOs,129 they are able to escape the 
market discipline that residuals were meant to exert.  As one CDO manager 
ABS Collateral Composition and Performance 6 (2004) [hereinafter, S&P, CDO Spotlight:  
U.S. CDO of ABS Collateral Composition and Performance].  Any CDO with a weighted 
average rating of BBB or lower is likely to be backed in part by double- or single-B bonds. 
 127. FitchRatings, supra note 7, at 1; see also Morgenson, supra note 84; S&P, CDO 
Spotlight:  U.S. CDO of ABS Collateral Composition and Performance, supra note 126, at 4. 
 128. See Hurst, supra note 62, at 285 (observing that “[r]etention of [the residual] by the 
seller-servicer provides a primary motivation to maximize the cash flow in the trust (i.e., 
accelerate collections and minimize losses) so that the value of the residual is realized”). 
 129. See Hagerty & Simon, supra note 125, at C1 (“CDOs . . . are the biggest buyers of 
the riskier types of mortgage securities”); Nomura Installing Sub-Piece Fund, Asset-Backed 
Alert, Nov. 28, 2003, at 2 (describing Nomura’s plans to organize a CDO conduit to 
“present[] asset-backed issuers with a ready-made buyer for their hard-to-sell B pieces”); 
Shenn, supra note 123, at 10 (describing two subprime transactions and noting that “a 
healthy appetite for [CDOs] among foreign investors, pension funds, and hedge funds has let 
many [subprime] securitizers pass lower-quality bonds to CDO underwriters”;); 
FitchRatings, supra note 7, at 1; S&P, Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria, supra 
note  126, at 21 (stating that CDO managers “have an appetite not only for senior tranches, 
but also for mezzanine pieces in senior-subordinated transactions, typically rated in the range 
of ‘BBB’ to ‘BB’”); see also Janet M. Tavakoli, Collateralized Debt Obligations and 
Structured Finance:  New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization 261 (2003); 
H&R Block, Inc. Annual Investment Community Conference, New York City—F, FD (Fair 
Disclosure) Wire, Jan. 10, 2006 (announcing “we’re going to be more aggressive at 
monetizing and moving those residuals on a more recurring basis”); Infovest 21 LLC, supra 
note 99 (interviewing a CDO manager who stated that “we might be comfortable buying a 
single B”); National City Corp. Analysts’ Conference—Final, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, 
May 26, 2005, (announcing that “we . . . basically sold the portion of that risk that 
corresponded from single-A down to double-B”); Jody Shenn, Pipeline:  Too Excited?, Am. 
Banker, May 26, 2005, at 11 (explaining that the fact that subprime “originators might not 
want to hold on to credit risks in this environment” fuels CDOs); Allison Pyburn, Terwin 
Priced High Resi Concentration CDO, Asset Securitization Rep., May 9, 2005 (announcing 
first CDO, named Northwall I, issued by Terwin Money Management LLC; deal contained 
86.5% of subprime RMBS and “[r]oughly 35% of the assets backing the deal came off of 
Terwin’s books”); Q4 2005 Ocwen Financial. Earnings Conference Call—F, FD (Fair 
Disclosure) Wire, Jan. 26, 2006 (announcing Ocwen’s plan to “target acquisitions of residual 
securities” to hedge its mortgage servicing operations); S&P, CDO Spotlight:  U.S. CDO of 
ABS Collateral Composition and Performance, supra note 126, at 4; cf. Countrywide 
Financial Corp. Analyst Meeting—Final, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, May 24, 2005 
(announcing a new Countrywide private equity fund called Sunfish “investing[] almost 
exclusively in [Countrywide] sub prime residuals” that enabled Countrywide to 
“offload[] . . . 100 percent of our residual”; stating that Countrywide was likewise 
considering issuing CDOs because “we have the product to fill the CDO”; noting that “in the 
CDO market all the equity gets sold out, much of the equity is not retained”); Andreas A. 
Jobst, Risk Management of CDOs During Times of Stress, EuroMoney Institutional Investor, 
Nov. 28, 2005, at 8 (“CDO managers are frequently exposed to the equity tranche, which 
absorbs first losses and, hence, represents the riskiest element . . .”). 
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put it, CDOs create “an awful lot of moral hazard in the [subprime RMBS] 
sector.”130
C.  Due Diligence Is Often Cursory 
Despite recent spurs to action from the Lehman Brothers case and state 
assignee liability laws, industry and government observers agree that 
subprime due diligence is uneven and in need of improvement.131  This is 
true for public offerings of subprime RMBS, where institutional investors 
often have a real chance to insist on meaningful due diligence in advance, 
and even more so for Rule 144A private placements.132  There is such 
intense demand for Rule 144A offerings that institutional investors usually 
have to make snap judgments whether to invest without time for any 
substantive due diligence; most simply rely on lenders, underwriters, and 
rating agencies, even though none of these entities has the same level of 
interest in avoiding credit losses as the investors themselves.  Thus, due 
diligence in the private-label subprime market often shoots low and almost 
never attempts to filter out predatory loan terms or practices unless they are 
observationally illegal. 
1.  What Subprime Due Diligence Means Today 
In subprime deals, underwriters, rating agencies, and lenders, not 
investors, conduct most due diligence.  Due diligence is typically limited to 
determining lender compliance with state and federal consumer protection 
laws.133  For example, automated compliance systems tailor their screening 
tools to the legal requirements of each jurisdiction.134  Similarly, the rating 
agencies only require screening for legal compliance and nothing more.135
 130. Allison Pyburn, CDO Investors Debate Morality of Spread Environment, Asset 
Securitization Rep., May 9, 2005; accord Jody Shenn, MBS Pioneer Has Concerns:  Risk-
Passing, GSE Reforms, Commercial Realty, Am. Banker, June 19, 2006, at 1. 
 131. See, e.g., Beidl, supra note 103; Neil J. Morse, Making and Selling Good Loans, 
Mortgage Banking, June 2003, at 107; Morse, supra note 99; Shenn, supra note 114; GAO, 
supra note 109, at 81. 
 132. Rule 144A governs private placements of securities, typically to institutional 
investors. See infra notes 152-165 and accompanying text. 
 133. This is evident both from industry descriptions of the limited due diligence 
performed and from statements by banking attorneys about the need for improved reviews of 
legal compliance. See, e.g., The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 479, 
499 n.51 (2004) (in which an investment bank, in representations to the Federal Reserve 
Board, limited its description of its due diligence reviews of subprime securitizations to 
“evaluations to determine if the lenders are complying with federal and state laws”); Bank of 
America Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 217, 224 & n.35 (2004) (same).  None of these statements 
discusses compliance with industry standards or even aspires to such compliance. See Shenn, 
supra note 114. 
 134. See ComplianceEase, ComplianceAnalyzer:  Automated Compliance Solutions, 
http://www.complianceease.com. 
 135. See, e.g., FitchRatings, Can You See Me Now?  Screening for RMBS Predatory 
Lending Loans (Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/ 
03/fitch_1112.pdf [hereinafter FitchRatings, Can You See Me Now?]; FitchRatings, Fitch 
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Limiting due diligence to legal compliance is problematic, given the 
large existing gaps in governing law.  Today, numerous lending abuses 
remain legal under state and federal law.136  The principal federal anti-
predatory lending law, HOEPA,137 has strong proscriptions but at best 
covers the costliest five percent of subprime home loans.138  Similarly, 
many states lack strong anti-predatory lending laws.139  With legal 
protections against abusive subprime loans weak in many states and at the 
federal level, the absence of meaningful due diligence paves the way for 
inclusion of predatory loans in securitized loan pools. 
When due diligence is required, it is not uncommon for some lenders to 
honor that requirement in the breach, i.e., to say they performed loan-level 
review when they did not.  In 2004, the General Accounting Office (now 
the Government Accountability Office or GAO) looked at this issue and 
concluded that “some companies may be more willing than others to 
purchase loans that are considered questionable in terms of legal 
compliance, creditworthiness, or other factors.”140  As one subprime lender 
explained to the press, “[w]e’re not structured to do 100 percent due 
diligence [on certain subprime loan pools], even though Wall Street 
investment banks might want that.”141  Lenders who offer low- or no-
documentation loans are even more prone to skip compliance review.142
In the conforming market, both government-sponsored entities do require 
substantive screening of subprime loans.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
have best practices standards for residential mortgages to borrowers with 
Ratings Updates Rating Criteria Regarding Predatory Loans (Jan. 15, 2004); FitchRatings, 
Fitch Revises RMBS Guidelines for Antipredatory Lending Laws (Feb. 23, 2005) 
[hereinafter FitchRatings, Fitch Revises RMBS Guidelines]; S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending 
Alert:  Standard & Poor’s Revises Criteria Related to Anti-Predatory Lending Laws (May 
13, 2004). 
 136. See Azmy, supra note 70.  Other federal and state laws of a general nature regulate 
aspects of predatory lending, but those laws have not succeeded in stamping out numerous 
predatory lending abuses. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1299-1317. 
 137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000). 
 138. See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, 65608 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
 139. See Azmy, supra note 70. 
 140. GAO, supra note 109, at 81.  Some issuers and servicers apparently still put too 
much effort into checking for facial, rather than actual, compliance.  As one attorney 
cautioned subprime servicers:  “[R]eviewing written policies and procedures tells only half 
the story.  It is imperative also to understand how those policies and procedures are 
implemented in practice.”  Andrew L. Sandler et al., Risk Management in Mortgage Loan 
Servicing and Collection, 71 Rev. Banking & Fin. Serv. 71 (2004) (listing due diligence 
checklist). 
 141. Morse, supra note 99, at 56-57. 
 142. See Shenn, supra note 114, at 6M (“‘The scary [lenders] are the ones that use [Alt-A 
loans] as an additional menu item’ without performing any additional controls.”).  These so-
called low-doc and no-doc loans make up a growing segment of the subprime market. See, 
e.g., S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products:  Subprime Sector First-Quarter 
2005, charts 2 & 6 (July 14, 2005). 
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blemished credit that are stricter in some respects than the laws in many 
jurisdictions.143
Outside of the conforming market, lenders, issuers, and/or major 
investors are free to adopt internal standards of their own.144  Nonetheless, 
usually only market actors with high reputational risk, such as bank holding 
companies contemplating mergers or lenders previously sanctioned for 
abusive lending, go to such lengths.145  For most other private-label market 
participants, industry self-policing is virtually non-existent.  Thus, in the 
non-conforming market for subprime RMBS, lenders and underwriters 
rarely screen out loans that are not prohibited by law, even if those loans 
violate industry standards or inflict significant harm on borrowers.  
Furthermore, underwriters are under constant pressure to relax their due 
diligence, for fear that lenders will move their underwriting business to 
other underwriting firms. 
In sum, the subprime secondary market has not adopted industry best 
practices voluntarily and will not screen out predatory loans from loan 
pools unless compelled to by statute, regulations, or court orders.146
2.  Impediments to Meaningful Due Diligence by Investors 
When it comes to screening out predatory loans, investors generally rely 
on due diligence by rating agencies, underwriters, and lenders.  With 
advance opportunity, institutional investors will generally review the 
disclosures, ratings, structure, and credit enhancements.  Otherwise, they 
 143. See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished Credit 
Records, Lender Letter No. 03-00, Apr. 11, 2000, available at 
http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2000/lendltrs2000.pdf; Press Release, 
Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Promotes Consumer Choice With New Subprime Mortgage 
Arbitration Policy (Dec. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/afford_housing/2003/consumer_120403.html; 
Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Will No Longer Invest in Subprime Mortgages 
with Prepayment Penalty Terms Greater Than Three Years (Mar. 1 2002), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives2002/subprime_030102.htm; Freddie Mac’s 
Stance Against Predatory Lending Practices, Industry Letter, (Freddie Mac), Dec. 28, 2000, 
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/1228indltr.pdf; Reports to 
Credit Repositories, Industry Letter (Freddie Mac), Feb. 22, 2000, available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/2indltr.pdf; Single-Premium Credit 
Insurance Products, Industry Letter (Freddie Mac), Apr. 21, 2000, available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/421indltr.pdf.  The Mortgage Bankers 
Association has adopted weaker, non-binding best practices standards for residential 
mortgages.  Mortgage Bankers Ass’n of America, MBA Best Practices, 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/IndustryResources/StandardsandBestPractices/MBABestPr
actices.htm. (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 144. See, e.g., Raman et al., supra note 107 (recommending incorporation of specific best 
practices standards into screening criteria).  See supra note 32 for discussion of the 
differences between the conforming and non-conforming or private label markets. 
 145. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (2004). 
 146. See Jennifer Harmon, ‘Purchaser Can’t Test for Compliance in Secondary,’ Nat’l 
Mortgage News, June 7, 2004, at 32. 
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tend to be passive, especially regarding predatory lending concerns.147  
Only rarely do investors inspect loan files for fraud.148  Similarly, investors 
rarely reserve the right post-closing to be notified of predatory lending 
complaints, to conduct random spot checks, or to perform special audits of 
lenders when warning signs of predatory lending crop up.149  Yet after-the-
fact monitoring may be the only way to detect certain types of loan fraud 
and predatory servicing.150
Even if investors wanted to engage in more extensive due diligence on 
their own, market and legal forces would often impede their efforts.  To 
begin with, numerous subprime securitizations are floated on a to-be-
announced basis.  In TBA offerings, when investors buy their securities, the 
loans have not yet been pooled, leaving the content of the pool up to the 
lender’s discretion.151  While investors can reserve the right to review the 
eventual loan pool post-closing, that is a risky proposition because they lose 
much of their leverage once they part with their funds. 
The law on Rule 144A placements also impedes effective due diligence.  
Growing numbers of subprime RMBS offerings are issued as Rule 144A 
private placements, rather than as public offerings under Section 5 of the 
Securities Act of 1933.152  Before 1990, limited offerings and private 
placements under Rule 144153 lacked liquidity because investors could not 
resell their securities for two years without costly registration under Section 
5.154  To remedy this situation, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
 147. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 543-44. 
 148. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (2004) (describing JP 
Morgan’s “loan sampling process [as including] obtaining a secondary value on the 
mortgaged property, performing cost tests before purchase, and performing targeted reviews 
of purchased loans”); Bank of America Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 217 & n.35 (2004) 
(describing loan sampling); Citigroup Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (2001)  (EAB); Citigroup 
Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613 (2001) (Banamex). But see Mark L. Korell, TThe Workings of 
Private Mortgage Bankers and Securitization Conduits, in A Primer on Securitization, supra 
note 37 at 99-100 (reporting that some investors are asking private mortgage conduits to “dig 
out data on the underlying loans in individual pools”); Jody Shenn, New Bear Stearns Unit to 
Provide Collateral for MBS, Am. Banker, Apr. 20, 2005, at 10. 
 149. Cf. Sandler et al., supra note 140, at 75 (“One of the most effective risk management 
tools available to non-prime servicers is a process to address customer complaints promptly 
and professionally, with an appropriate audit oversight to review and improve the process.”).  
Red flags can include press reports of predatory lending allegations, higher-than-expected 
delinquency or default rates, borrower complaints, government investigations, and predatory 
lending lawsuits. 
 150. See Baron, supra note 37, at 90; see also infra notes 218-230 and accompanying 
text. 
 151. See Boudoukh et al., supra note 60, at 410, 419; Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra 
note 54, at 6-7. 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2000); see Dominion Bond Rating Service, U.S. Structured 
Finance Newsletter, Mar. 28, 2005, available at 
http://cache.dbrs.com/pdf/1112204169687.pdf?transactionID=109714 (listing recent Rule 
144A subprime RMBS offerings). 
 153. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006). 
 154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1989).  In 1997, the Securities Exchange Commission 
(S.E.C.) reduced the holding period under Rule 144 to one year. See Revision of Holding 
Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242 (1997). 
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(S.E.C.) issued Rule 144A in 1990.155  Rule 144A states that if a private 
placement or limited offering is offered or sold solely to parties who are 
reasonably believed to be Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs), those 
investors can resell the securities at any time to other QIBs without 
registration.156
In order for a private placement to qualify for Rule 144A treatment, 
domestic issuers must provide prospective purchasers with some scant 
information upon request, as follows:  (a) a “very brief” statement of the 
nature of the issuer’s products, services, and business; and (b) the issuer’s 
financial statements (including balance sheets, profit and loss statements, 
and retained earnings statements) for the past two years.  The information 
must be “reasonably current” and financial statements “should be audited to 
the extent reasonably available.”157  For RMBS, servicers or trustees also 
need to provide “basic, material information concerning the structure of the 
securities and distributions thereon, the nature, performance and servicing 
of the assets supporting the securities, and any credit enhancement 
mechanism associated with the securities.”158
The key point here is that Rule 144A does not require issuers to provide 
prospective purchasers anything beyond basic information about the risk 
profile of the loan pool.  As a result, investors do not have access to the 
information they need to screen out predatory loans.  Because Rule 144A 
transactions allow re-sales to QIBs, these offerings are in high demand.  
“Transactions are usually bought and sold very quickly[,] thereby giving the 
buyer very little opportunity to conduct due diligence.”159  Thus, in the 
Rule 144A market, “liquidity comes at a price.”160  The “lack of sufficient 
disclosure” and “very little opportunity for due diligence” deprives Rule 
144A investors of “the protections accorded to investors in registered public 
bond offerings.”161
 155. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1990). 
 156. Id.; see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 95, at 1408-10. 
 157. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (2006). 
 158. Id. § 230.144A(d)(4); Resale of Restricted Securities, Release No. 33,6862, 55 Fed. 
Reg. 17,933 (Apr. 30, 1990) (17 C.F.R. pts. 200 & 230); Kutak Rock & Campbell, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1273 (Nov. 29, 1990) (declining to answer 
questions regarding the adequacy of Rule 144A disclosures for mortgage-backed securities).  
Even these minimal disclosures are relaxed if the issuer is a reporting company under 
sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is exempt from such reporting 
under S.E.C. Rule 12g3-2(b), is a foreign government, or falls within a category of certain 
private foreign issuers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i).  In 2005, the S.E.C. promulgated new 
Regulation AB, which revamped mandatory disclosures for public offerings of mortgage-
backed securities to include information regarding the composition and performance of the 
pool, static pool data, the structure of deals, certain underwriting criteria, and servicing 
experience. See Asset-Backed Securities, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506 (Jan. 7, 2005).  The new 
disclosure requirements do not apply to Rule 144A private placements of mortgage-backed 
securities, however. 
 159. Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 28. 
 160. Id. at 30. 
 161. Id.  The placement agent will normally conduct due diligence of some sort before the 
offering and will obtain comfort letters from lawyers and accountants. See id. at 27.  Because 
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The lack of meaningful due diligence by investors is compounded by 
weak covenants after-the-fact.  In Rule 144A deals, “buyers are offered 
very few covenants and less extensive representations and warranties.”162  
Furthermore, the representations and warranties do not survive the closing 
of the transactions.163  Instead, the assurances “run to the placement agent, 
not to the ultimate buyer.”164  As a result, investors cannot rely on 
contractual guarantees as a backstop for absent due diligence:  
Originators try to grant investors as weak a covenant package as possible, 
thereby giving the originator as much leeway as possible in terms of what 
it can do with the asset.  In that respect, some of the originator’s best 
assets could be long gone before the senior secured investor finds out and 
given the weak set of representations and warranties that are made at the 
time of funding of the transaction, there is . . . very little that can be done 
at that stage.165
In sum, due diligence by investors—the people with the most to lose—is 
hit or miss, particularly in the Rule 144A market. 
D.  Recourse Clauses Are Limited in Reach and Are Not Consistently 
Enforced 
As we already discussed, recourse clauses are relatively common and 
require lenders to take back bad loans.  Their practical effect is limited, 
however, by spotty enforcement.166  In some cases, lenders refuse to honor 
the placement agent does not bear credit risk in the transaction, however, it does not have the 
same incentives as investors for more thorough risk assessment. 
 162. Id. at 28; see also id. at 38 (“[W]ith the advent of Rule 144A offerings, market 
practice has done away with the . . . finer aspects of private placements such as negotiation 
of covenants and due diligence.”); see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the 
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1 (2004). 
 163. Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 28. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 38. 
 166. See Shenn, supra note 114 (noting that investors rarely attempt to enforce reps and 
warranties); Shenn, supra note 123, at 1; Interview with Kevin Byers (June 9, 2005).  When 
delinquencies rise, securitized trusts and investment banks are more likely to insist that 
originators buy back bad loans and that is happening now.  Even so, the percentage of 
affected loans is small.  Credit Suisse Group found, for example, that among 208 subprime 
RMBS bond deals that it studied for 2005 and 2006, the dollar value of mortgages 
repurchased was “well under 1% of the total value of mortgages in the pools with at least 
one repurchase . . . .” Ruth Simon & Michael Hudson, Bad Loans Draw Bad Blood, Wall St. 
J., Oct. 9, 2006, at C1. Even this limited enforcement of recourse clauses is cyclical in nature 
and the market has a very short memory.  As one commentator observed, “‘In a rising 
market, even a bad loan is a good loan.’” Id. (quoting Nate Redleaf, research analyst, 
Imperial Capital LLC).  In the meantime, recent potential buyers of subprime lenders have 
sought “to avoid inheriting the subprime sellers’ costly obligation of having to buy back the 
loans already sold in the secondary market because of borrowers’ defaults.”  Lingling Wei, 
Subprime Lenders Are Hard Sell, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 2006, at C5.   The dictates of federal 
bankruptcy law also place limits on the scope of recourse clauses.  Under the bankruptcy 
code, the sale of loans to the SPV must constitute a “true sale” in order for the receivables to 
be excluded from the bankruptcy estate in the event of the originator’s failure. See Schwarcz, 
supra note 38, § 4:1.  If recourse exceeds specific levels—generally defined as historical 
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recourse clauses and trustees decide that going to court would be unduly 
expensive.167  In other cases, poorly capitalized lenders or brokers have 
gone out of business or lack the funds to buy back their old, non-performing 
loans.168  As a prominent industry attorney observed:  “[I]f you purchase 
loans from small operators, there may not be much water in the well of their 
repentance. . . . If you do postclosing due diligence and you find 10 percent 
of your portfolio is affected, what loan broker, with no capitalization, can 
take back the loan?”169
Even when recourse is successful, investors have to worry about the 
quality of the replacement collateral.  Lenders who accept recourse must 
substitute new loans for the bad loans.  However, lenders often obtain deal 
provisions that allow them unilaterally to substitute collateral.170  Thus, 
recourse provisions, which are supposed to give lenders incentives to desist 
from making predatory loans, actually enable lenders to substitute one bad 
loan for another.  As one analyst warned:  
Once losses eat through the original equity investment, the trading desk 
has a huge incentive to stuff the portfolio with high margin, risky assets to 
maximize the residual cash flows.  If investors choose to participate in 
these deals, they need to carefully examine the structural handcuffs that 
will prevent [such] trading . . . .171
Finally, even if a lender does take back a predatory loan, it will not 
necessarily lose money.  If the borrower still has equity in the home, the 
lender may persuade him or her to refinance the loan, extract new, large 
fees, and eventually foreclose.172
levels of losses—then the “true sale” requirement will be defeated. See, e.g., Bjerre, supra 
note 2, at 417. 
 167. Interview with Kevin Byers, supra note 166.  Securitized trusts are more willing to 
enforce recourse provisions when the market for mortgage-backed securities softens and 
default risks rise. Jesse Eisinger, Mortgage Market Begins to See Cracks as Subprime-Loan 
Problems Emerge, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at C1.  In the experience of one of the authors, 
however, recourse negotiations can take up to two years and still may not result in full 
recourse. 
 168. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 549, 556; Roundtable:  Vendors on New Prevention 
Tools, New Scams, Am. Banker, Dec. 9, 2005, at 11, 12 [hereinafter Roundtable] (describing 
“the ease with which [mortgage] entities morph into different businesses”); Shenn, supra 
note 123, at 1. 
 169. DeZube, supra note 103, at 32. 
 170. S&P, Rating Affirmations And Their Impact On Investors (Apr. 20, 2005).  Such 
clauses are permissible in Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT) 
structures, which Congress conferred with favored tax status in the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996. See Phillip R. Pollock & Michael E. Shaff, FASIT Flexibility Applied 
to Subprime Securitizations, in Subprime Consumer Lending, supra note 123, at 155, 156-57 
(a “major benefit of FASITs over REMICs is the ability to add or substitute assets to the 
structure after the startup period and to remove collateral”). 
 171. Tavakoli, supra note 129, at 263. 
 172. Non-bank lenders, in particular, are willing to pursue foreclosure aggressively. See, 
e.g., David Leonhardt, Lenders Trying An Alternative To Foreclosure, N.Y. Times, May 4, 
2002, at A1 (stating that “banks, which service many [loans in default, have] a variety of 
financial incentives to work out new terms and avoid foreclosure” and contrasting predatory 
lenders, who are willing to aggressively foreclose). 
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E.  Retained Servicing Rights Are Not the Norm 
It is rare these days for lenders to retain servicing rights.  Today, the loan 
servicing industry is highly concentrated, largely due to economies of scale.  
Rather than insist that lenders retain servicing rights—as a way to discipline 
lenders—investors or bond insurers usually press them to employ outside 
master servicers to ensure a high level of servicing.173  As a result, the 
originator’s loan servicing rights are generally sold for a fee to one of a 
small group of specialist firms in the field.174  Thus, high potential 
servicing costs are not disincentives to lenders making predatory loans. 
F.  Excess Demand for Subprime Securitizations 
Excess demand is a final reason why investors do not screen subprime 
RMBS for predatory practices.  In 2004, for instance, S&P observed that 
“the market for subprime mortgage securities [experienced] significantly 
more demand than availability for many issuances.”175  Other observers 
concur that the market for subprime RMBS suffers from excess demand.176
Rule 144A private placements are in short supply because they offer 
liquidity.  In addition, there is a clamor for subprime RMBS of all types, 
driven by portfolio regulation of institutional investors such as banks and 
insurance companies.  Many institutional investors have legal limits on the 
types of investments they can buy for their own account.177  Given those 
limits, high yields make subprime RMBS attractive,178 particularly when 
other legal investments are in the doldrums.  Because the demand for bonds 
in subprime securitizations exceeds supply, investors are willing to 
purchase bonds without engaging in thorough due diligence. 
In sum, the risk management mechanisms used by securitization do not 
trickle down to deter lending abuses.  At the same time, structured finance 
 173. See McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 145. 
 174. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 544. 
 175. S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products:  Subprime Sector, Fourth-
Quarter 2004, at 3 (Apr. 12, 2005). 
 176. See Morse, Not Exactly Prime, supra note 109, at 63 (“All this investor interest in 
subprime loans is propelled by the mountain of money piling up on the sidelines of the stock 
market, fearing entry into that uninviting terrain.  ‘Mutual funds, hedge funds, private-equity 
funds are sitting on a tremendous amount of liquidity,’ says Kenneth Slosser, managing 
director of investment banking at Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., Inc., Irvine, 
California.”); Allison Pyburn, Spread Debate Dominates Global ABS Conference in 
Barcelona, Asset Securitization Rep., June 20, 2005; see also Lupica, supra note 1, at 630. 
 177. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Banking Law Manual:  Federal Regulation of Financial 
Holding Companies, Banks and Thrifts § 7.03[1] (2d ed. 2001); Howell E. Jackson, 
Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry:  An Exploratory Essay, 77 Wash. 
U. L.Q. 319, 352-56 (1999). 
 178. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Mortgages Grow Riskier, and Investors Are Attracted, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 6, 2006, at C1; Simon et al., supra note 124, at A1 (“[I]n an era of low returns, 
mortgage-backed securities offer yield-starved investors much higher returns than 
government bonds.”); Banc of America Securities, ABS Research Note, at 2 (Feb. 8, 2005) 
(reporting that in 1994, “subprime home equity ABS [asset-backed securities] was [sic] the 
best performing ABS sector, followed by credit card ABS and auto ABS sectors”). 
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protects investors so well that S&P routinely assures investors that 
subprime RMBS “should continue to perform in accordance with 
expectations, given the advances in loan level modeling, structural 
safeguards, and improvement in loss mitigation techniques.”179
VII.  NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION IN 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIZATIONS 
Securitization successfully protects investors and reaps profits for rating 
agencies, lenders, and investment banks, without protecting borrowers from 
abusive loans.  This situation gives rise to the question:  Should the law 
create incentives for securitizers to detect and protect against predatory 
lending?  For the reasons that follow, we answer this question in the 
affirmative. 
A.  Predatory Lending Harms Borrowers and Imposes External Costs on 
Communities 
Under the current legal regime, borrowers, neighborhoods, and cities bear 
the brunt of abusive lending, while securitization insulates investors from 
having to internalize those costs.  When lenders make loans that borrowers 
cannot afford to repay, borrowers can lose their homes to foreclosure.  
Others keep their homes only by reducing spending on necessities such as 
health insurance, medical bills, day care, and critical home repairs.  When 
predatory lending results in vacant homes and neighborhood decline, cities 
lose tax revenues and must pay for added police protection and other city 
services.180  The total annual cost to homeowners and cities is in the 
billions of dollars.181
B.  The Secondary Market Can More Efficiently Bear the Costs of Policing 
Predatory Lenders 
The deregulation of home mortgage loans and the growth of 
nontraditional lending have impeded comparison-shopping and enabled 
lenders to market loans with complex terms that borrowers do not 
understand.182  As a result, many borrowers enter into complex loans 
without understanding the terms or their repayment obligations.  Currently, 
the only effective way for borrowers to ensure that they are not entering 
into predatory loans is to hire lawyers, costing several hundred dollars 
apiece to review the loan terms and advise them to walk out of closings if 
loan terms prove abusive. 
 179. S&P, supra note 175, at 5. 
 180. See Engel, supra note 12, at 356-60. 
 181. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 4, at 5, 27; Eric Stein, Quantifying the 
Economic Cost of Predatory Lending (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Fordham Law Review) (estimating losses from predatory lending at $9.1 billion annually). 
 182. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1275, 1311-12. 
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In contrast, the cost of screening out predatory loans from securitized 
loan pools is minimal.183  One study estimated that manual review of a loan 
file for predatory terms cost $43, or about three percent of origination 
costs.184  The same study found that automated review cost approximately 
one dollar per loan.185  Thus, unlike borrower attorneys, who must review 
individual closing files at substantial cost, securitizers can capture 
increasing returns to scale by purchasing technology that electronically 
reviews files at a fraction of lawyers’ cost. 
C.  Securitization Impedes Borrowers’ Ability to Obtain Relief from 
Predatory Loans 
Thinly capitalized lenders and brokers have the most to gain from 
securitization because they lack other forms of financing.186  For 
undercapitalized firms, securitization has two important effects.  First, it 
enables them to enter the subprime industry by providing them with 
financing.187  Second, it enables them to stay in operation despite low 
capital because they can plow the proceeds from securitization into a fresh 
set of loans, which in turn can be securitized.  In the process, originators 
can render themselves judgment-proof from lawsuits by borrowers by 
continually shedding their assets through securitization, distributing the 
profits to shareholders, and draining the company of capital.188  As one 
 183. See Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994:  
Extending Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market 
Participants, 18 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 151, 168-69 (2005) (noting that secondary market 
actors are in better positions than borrowers to detect “bad” lenders); Siddhartha Venkatesan, 
Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More 
Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 177, 207-08 
(discussing ways the secondary market can spread the cost of assignee liability). 
 184. See Delvin M. Davis & Ellen Schloemer, Strong Compliance Systems Support 
Profitable Lending While Reducing Predatory Practices 6 (Center for Responsible Lending 
2005), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ip010-Compliance_Costs-
0705.pdf. 
 185. Id.  In a study of mortgage origination costs, the Mortgage Bankers Association 
reported that the net operational origination cost averaged $1,485 per loan in 2004. See Press 
Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, MBA Releases Annual Cost Study (Oct. 12, 2005), 
available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/32173.htm. 
 186. Hill, supra note 15, at 1065-66, 1073, 1086, 1092-94, 1100, 1102, 1109; Lupica, 
supra note 1, at 627, 629-31; see also Eggert, supra note 2, at 546, 556-57. 
 187. As Freddie Mac’s former chairman Leland Brendsel observed, “[R]elatively little 
capital is required to start a mortgage banking operation . . . and even less to become a 
mortgage broker.  Lenders lacking the necessary net worth can still originate loans for 
lenders qualified to sell into the secondary market.”  Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization’s 
Role in Housing Finance:  The Special Contributions of the Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises, in A Primer on Securitization, supra note 37, at 19, 24. 
 188. When originators dissolve or go bankrupt, borrowers have little or no real recourse. 
See Erick Bergquist, Guess What? Loan Buyers Liable Under Federal Law, Am. Banker, 
May 7, 2004, at 1. 
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commentator put it:  “Securitization’s structure is designed to divert value 
away from the originator.”189
Even when originators can pay judgments against them, borrowers may 
not be able to obtain meaningful relief.  A lawsuit against the original 
lender or broker cannot halt a foreclosure by the securitized trust.  
Similarly, rescission or reformation may be difficult or impossible if loans 
are part of securitized loan pools.190
D.  Securitization Impedes Work-outs with Injured Borrowers 
Securitization complicates and often blocks work-outs with borrowers 
who are harmed by predatory loans.191  This is because the underlying 
securitization contracts tie the trustee’s and servicer’s hands if they attempt 
to negotiate a repayment plan in lieu of foreclosure.  The value of the 
securities and the amount of their returns are based on cash flows that are 
determined, in part, by the loan terms.  To protect these cash flows, 
securitization contracts typically prohibit changes to the terms of the 
underlying loans.  In addition, securitization contracts often prohibit 
servicers from waiving prepayment penalties and other loan provisions. 
Another roadblock arises when subprime lenders securitize prepayment 
penalties through bonds known as Net Interest Margin Securities 
(NIMS).192  If a borrower seeks reformation of a predatory loan, the 
reformation could be deemed a prepayment, thus triggering prepayment 
penalties.  Theoretically, the prepayment penalties could be waived as part 
of the work-out.  However, if the prepayment penalties have been 
securitized in a NIMS, contractually they cannot be waived.  S&P has 
assured this by insisting that issuers and servicers provide representations 
and warranties that they will rigidly enforce the prepayment penalties being 
securitized.193
 189. Lupica, supra note 1, at 598; see also Iacobucci & Winter, supra note 15, at 170; 
LoPucki, supra note 1, at 25-30. 
 190. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 560-66 (discussing the difficulty borrowers encounter if 
they seek to restructure a loan that has been securitized). 
 191. Id.; see generally Eggert, supra note 27. 
 192. See, e.g., Risk World, Standard & Poors Rates First NIMS Transaction 1, available 
at http://www.riskworld.com/PressRel/2000/00q3/PR00a059.htm; S&P, Legal Criteria 
Reaffirmed for the Securitization of Prepayment Penalties 1 (May 29, 2002); Vanderbilt 
Capital Advisors, Net Interest Margin (NIMs), available at 
http://www.vcallc.com/mailings/additions/net_interest.htm. 
 193. S&P does allow for exceptions in two instances, both of which erect high barriers to 
workouts.  First, S&P permits waiver where forgiveness would “maximize recovery of total 
proceeds” and is “standard and customary in servicing similar home equity loans.”  Press 
Release, S&P, Standard & Poor’s Clarifies Criteria For Prepayment Penalty Income In U.S. 
NIMs Transactions (2005).  Second, a NIMS based on prepayment penalty income can 
“allow the servicer/master servicer to waive prepayment penalties for any other reason,” but 
only at a steep price. Id.  In such cases, S&P requires the issuer either to obtain a guarantee 
or deposit funds in escrow to replace any missing future revenues from prepayment 
penalties. See id. 
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Finally, servicers have reduced incentives to assist borrowers who go into 
default.  Servicers can earn higher fees if they march borrowers to 
foreclosure rather than reform the borrowers’ loan terms or reschedule 
payments.  In short, securitization creates rigidities that make loan work-
outs difficult and often well nigh impossible. 
E.  Securitization Causes Borrowers to Pay an Excess Risk Premium 
Pricing anomalies in the subprime market provide additional support for 
our assignee liability proposal.  As we discussed, borrowers in the subprime 
market often pay prices that exceed their actual risk.  For instance, excess 
risk premiums arise when originators steer prime-eligible borrowers to 
subprime loans.  Excess premiums also arise when lenders impose 
prepayment penalties on borrowers that are not justified by risk or trade-
offs for lower interest rates.  To compound this situation, NIMS make 
subprime home loans more expensive by creating a strong, artificial 
demand for costly prepayment penalties that result in hefty fees to 
borrowers if the penalties are triggered.  Ultimately, as excess risk 
premiums push up loan costs to borrowers, their default risk rises, too.194  
Because securitization creates incentives for lenders to extract rents from 
borrowers, securitization should bear responsibility for the added default 
risk. 
F.  The Holder-in-due-course rule Creates Inequities 
The holder-in-due-course rule also creates inequities when loans are 
securitized.  When loans are sold, borrowers lose the ability to assert 
various defenses and affirmative claims against the new holders of the 
loans.  Thus, the very fact of the loan sale increases the value of the loan to 
the assignee with no direct benefit to the borrower.  At the same time, the 
borrower is harmed by the loss of full legal relief for a problem loan.  The 
impact of the holder-in-due-course rule becomes particularly perverse when 
it prevents borrowers from defending foreclosure actions by assignees. 
Ultimately, borrowers have no control over whether their loans are sold 
or held by lenders in portfolio.  As a matter of fairness, the law should not 
prevent borrowers from obtaining complete relief from abusive loans, 
especially because securitization creates added incentives toward predatory 
lending. 
 194. See Donald R. Haurin & Stuart S. Rosenthal, The Growth Earnings of Low-Income 
Households and the Sensitivity of Their Homeownership Choices to Economic and Socio-
Demographic Shocks 18 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham 
Law Review), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/EarningsOfLow-
IncomeHouseholds.pdf (when an adjustable rate mortgage adjusts upwards following 
closing, each percentage point increase makes it thirty percent more likely that a household 
will terminate homeownership and return to being renters). 
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G.  Subprime Borrowers Lack Effective Bargaining Power 
The marketing techniques that subprime lenders and brokers employ 
often impede borrowers’ ability to comparison shop and bargain for loans.  
The most abusive loans are targeted at unsophisticated people who believe 
that their ability to borrow money is limited.195  This targeting, coupled 
with high pressure tactics, such as promoting time-limited deals that require 
borrowers to commit or lose the option to borrow at “special” rates, leads 
borrowers to pay application fees immediately and commit to loans that 
may not be in their best interests.  Once the loan application process begins, 
borrowers become psychologically committed to the loans and, depending 
on the size of the application fee and the borrowers’ liquid assets, may not 
be able to afford to apply for another loan.196
At the time of application, subprime lenders typically reveal only the 
vaguest of terms to borrowers, waiting until closing to disclose the final 
provisions.  These last-minute changes in loan terms are problematic on 
several fronts.  First, borrowers are boundedly rational in the sense that they 
are able to process some, but not all, loan terms.197  Typically, they focus 
on simple price terms, such as the monthly payment amount, and ignore 
other potentially onerous terms, like prepayment penalties.198  Lenders can 
exploit these limits on borrowers’ ability to absorb information to their 
advantage.  Second, when the final loan terms are presented to borrowers at 
closing, essential terms are often obscured in the shuffle of complicated 
loan papers.  Many borrowers may believe that they are obligated to enter 
the loan at closing even though the law permits them to walk away from the 
closing or rescind the loan within three days of the closing.  Others, who 
may have experienced credit discrimination or who worry that their access 
to credit is limited, may fear that they will lose access to future credit if they 
reject proffered loans.199  The secondary market benefits from the resulting 
one-sided contracts and, therefore, should be responsible for some of the 
damage these contract terms cause. 
 195. This targeting is often race-based. See Bocian et al., supra note 26, at 3-5; Kathleen 
C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, From Credit Denial To Predatory Lending:  The Challenge 
of Sustaining Minority Homeownership 35-38 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Fordham Law Review) (discussing numerous studies on the link between subprime 
lending and race); Complaint at 9, Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Allied Home 
Mortgage Capital Corp. (June 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press_releases/documents/2006/HUDComplaint.pdf. 
 196. Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1283. 
 197. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:  
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1481, 1530 (2006) 
 198. Id. at 1539-40; see generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard 
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1225-44 (2003) 
(describing how bounded rationality can lead to contract terms that favor sellers at the 
expense of unwitting buyers). 
 199. Engel & McCoy, supra note 195, at 30-31. 
~9555358 3/19/2007  3:20 PM 
2007] TURNING A BLIND EYE 143 
In sum, although securitization has enabled many people to obtain loans 
who, in pre-securitization days, could not secure loans, it has also helped to 
spawn predatory lending and has impeded the ability of borrowers to obtain 
meaningful relief from abusive loans.  These inequities, the other negative 
externalities that predatory lending imposes on borrowers and cities, and the 
unwillingness of the secondary market to police predatory lenders 
effectively justify imposing liability on assignees. 
VIII.  AN ASSIGNEE LIABILITY PROPOSAL 
In the non-conforming market, experience has shown that abusive loans 
will continue to be securitized unless the law creates incentives to screen 
out predatory loans.  Furthermore, the time has come to hold the secondary 
market responsible for policing lenders.  Accordingly, we propose a system 
of assignee liability that rewards entities that engage in due diligence 
designed to detect loans with abusive terms.  Our proposal would impose 
extensive liability on assignees that failed to adopt the due diligence 
standards we discuss below and would cap liability for those assignees that 
complied with the specifications we outline. 
A.  Considerations When Designing a Due Diligence Standard for 
Securitizing Residential Mortgage Loans 
In formulating a due diligence standard for securitizing home loans, 
several considerations must be kept in mind.  First, any due diligence 
standard should ideally contemplate individual loan review.  Second, a 
screening standard must be cost-effective.  Any standard that is expensive 
would counteract the goal of combating abusive lending by pushing up the 
cost of home loans.  Third, screening requires adoption of strong 
nationwide standards making clear what constitutes a predatory term or 
practice.  Fourth, screening should only apply to abusive terms and 
practices that are capable of detection on a cost-effective basis.  As we 
recognize, some types of mortgage fraud are not amenable to advance 
screening.  Finally, screening should be adaptable to the to-be-announced 
and Rule 144A markets. 
1.  Cost-Effective Screening of Individual Loans 
Ideally, due diligence should aspire to more than facial compliance.  In 
particular, it should check for actual compliance with anti-predatory lending 
criteria by reviewing all individual loans in the loan pool.  There are two 
methods of verifying actual compliance:  automated compliance and 
manual inspection.  Each method has its advantages and flaws. 
Automated compliance systems have recently come to the fore.  These 
systems check every loan for compliance with state and local anti-predatory 
laws, federal disclosure laws, and other criteria designated by the lender or 
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investor.200  The advances in automated compliance followed the recent 
spate of state anti-predatory lending laws. 
Loan aggregators and investment banks use several different automated 
compliance systems to screen tapes with data on individual loans.201  
LendTech® by ARC Systems™, for example, provides individually tailored 
automatic underwriting and due diligence systems to lenders, wholesalers, 
investment bankers, and investors.202  LendTech® allows lenders to 
“upload credit and mortgage applications with a full credit file into the 
automated model” in advance of warehousing or securitizing their loans.203  
A competing product, ComplianceAnalyzer®, is “a pre-close, automated, 
transaction-level approach” to regulatory compliance.204  The premier 
version, known as ComplianceAnalyzer® Plus, furnishes “lenders, 
investors, and securitizers [with] comprehensive regulatory compliance 
auditing (including ‘high-cost’ and ‘anti-predatory’ lending legislation).”205  
The manufacturer of the premier line, ComplianceEase, is so confident 
about its ability to assure compliance that it offers “a comprehensive and 
flexible warranty backed by an A.M. Best "A-" or better (Excellent) rated 
insurer. Each loan can be covered up to $250,000 and the coverage is also 
easily transferable to secondary market investors.”206  Other automated 
compliance systems include InvestorServices by CoreLogic, High Cost 
Analyzer by Clayton, 2Comply by Mavent, and Wiz Sentinel by PCi 
Corporation.207  These automated compliance review programs can screen 
loans for one dollar a loan and probably less.208
 200. Indeed, Fitch considers it “virtually impossible for originators of any meaningful 
size to monitor compliance with predatory lending laws, as is required on a loan-level basis, 
without the assistance of technology.” FitchRatings, Can You See Me Now?, supra note 
135. 
 201. See Erick Bergquist, Some Lenders Turning to Compliance Software, Am. Banker, 
Apr. 1, 2003, at 12; Mary Dum, ARC Helps PCFS Get the Brass Ring, 10 Mortgage 
Technology 41 (2003); Anthony Garritano, Automating the LAW:  Mavent drills compliance 
down to a few clicks, Mortgage Tech., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 30; Morse, Not Exactly Prime, 
supra note 109.  Since the late 1990s, S&P has required issuers to provide S&P with data 
tapes containing loan level data with a variety of data fields, including credit risk and credit 
scores.  S&P uses the data tapes to assign risk grades to each loan in a loan pool under its 
automated LEVELS™ credit scoring model. See, e.g., Raiter, supra note 123, at 147. 
 202. See ARC Systems, Products & Services, available at 
http://www.arcsystems.com/products.htm. 
 203. Dum, supra note 201, at 41; see ARC Systems, LendTech Investor, available at 
http://www.arcsystems.com/lt_investor_matrix.htm. 
 204. ComplianceEase, ComplianceAnalyzer®:  Automated Compliance Solutions, 
http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite/prod/prod_ca_overview.jsp?content=/opencms/C
EContent/prod/prod_ca_overview_m.jsp&right=/opencms/CEContent/prod/r_critical_decisi
on.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007). 
 205. ComplianceEase, ComplianceAnalyzer® Plus with AssureCert® Protection, 
http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite/prod/prod_ac_overview.jsp?content=/opencms/C
EContent/prod/prod_ac_overview_m.jsp&right=/opencms/CEContent/prod/r_verify_assurec
ert.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Davis & Schloemer, supra note 184, at 8 tbl.2. 
 208. See id. at 6 & nn.21-24. 
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Some major lenders have already adopted these systems in order to meet 
legal compliance criteria that Fitch and S&P have imposed on residential 
mortgage securitizations.209  Secondary market adoption of automated 
compliance puts pressure on brokers and lenders to adopt the same 
safeguards.  As one observer put it:  
You know, the money controls the game. . . . [I]f an investor is using 
tools . . . then the broker or the originator will want to use that tool, too.  
Not for any ethical reasons or not for any obligation to the investor or 
anything.  Because they want to close that loan, and they want to move 
that loan.  The only reason.  Hey, whatever it takes. 210
Automated compliance is not enough, however.  “[L]oans may slip 
through the cracks” of automated compliance if data is entered incorrectly 
or too late for review or if the software does not apply the correct legal 
test.211  Accordingly, due diligence should augment automated systems 
with manual inspections of loans and tests to confirm that the right legal 
filters are in place. 
In manual inspection, a compliance team makes an on-site inspection of 
physical loan files and supporting documentation.  One advantage of 
manual inspection is that it can detect some types of loan fraud that 
automated compliance cannot.212  However, manual inspection is time-
intensive, taking on average thirty to forty-five minutes per loan.213  While 
manual inspection could be performed on every loan, normally it is limited 
to a sample of loans due to cost concerns.214  Although manual review costs 
more than automated screening, it is not financially prohibitive, costing 
about $43 per loan.215
 209. See id. at 8-9 & tbl.2.  GAO casts doubt on the effectiveness of automated 
compliance systems on grounds that “data tapes used for loan reviews do not include point 
and fee information.” See GAO, supra note 109, at 79.  Whether GAO’s assertion is true, it 
is beside the point.  While the data tapes that lenders provide to rating agencies vary in the 
extent to which they contain fee information, automated compliance systems must and do 
review points and fees to ascertain compliance with Truth in Lending Act disclosures and 
high-cost statutes such as HOEPA and state equivalents that have points and fees triggers.  
For example, ComplianceEase™ recalculates the annual percentage rate using the interest 
rate and finance charges from the actual loan documents. See ComplianceEase Offers 
Predatory Lending Compliance Certification for Wall Street Rating Agencies (June 20, 
2003), available at 
http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite/about/news/cenews_20030620_m.jsp. 
 210. See Roundtable, supra note 168, at 14. 
 211. See FitchRatings, supra note 200, at 2. 
 212. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Davis & Schloemer, supra note 184, at 6-7 & n.21. 
 214. When subprime RMBS underwriters do examine loan files manually, normally they 
“don’t do due diligence on every single loan in a pool; at most, they do a random sample of, 
say, 3% of the loans.”  Shepherd, supra note 29, at 4. 
 215. See Davis & Schloemer, supra note 184, at 6 & n.21. 
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2.  Meaningful Screening Requires Adoption of Strict National Anti-
Predatory Lending Standards 
Automated compliance systems and manual due diligence are designed to 
verify compliance with federal, state, and local consumer protection laws, 
including anti-predatory lending laws.  However, the current patchwork of 
federal, state, and local laws leaves many lending abuses unregulated.216  
Further, the private-label secondary market does not screen out loans with 
abusive features unless those abuses are unlawful. 
Thus, for screening to effectively curtail predatory lending wherever it 
occurs, it is necessary to adopt a strong set of anti-predatory lending 
standards that apply to home loans throughout the country.  Ideally such 
standards would be adopted directly through federal legislation,217 but a 
federal anti-predatory lending statute is not the only way to institute 
standards with broad national effect.  Other avenues might include a 
uniform state law or a joint rulemaking by federal banking regulators and 
the Federal Trade Commission declaring predatory practices illegal under 
the Federal Trade Commission Act.  Similarly, laws could specifically 
prohibit rating agencies from rating loan pools that contain loans with 
specified predatory terms or require the mortgage industry to adopt anti-
predatory lending standards that it would enforce through a self-regulatory 
organization.  However such standards are accomplished, effective 
screening will not take place until nationwide standards are adopted. 
3.  Screening and Its Limitations 
Screening cannot detect every predatory term or practice.  Some types of 
fraud will pass through automated filters and even manual inspection 
without detection.218  There are ways to uncover evidence of fraud, 
however, some of which are automated.  For instance, Fannie Mae’s and 
Freddie Mac’s automated underwriting systems issue alerts when there are 
 216. Even in states with strong anti-predatory lending laws, the effect of those laws is 
diluted by federal preemption rulings by federal banking regulators that exempt national 
banks, federal savings associations, and their operating subsidiaries from such state laws.  
See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s 
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection, 23 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 225 (2004). 
 217. For discussion of the contents of such a law, see Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 
1317-63, where we proposed a federal suitability standard for subprime mortgages.  In 
addition, HOEPA and its implementing regulations; the anti-predatory lending laws of a 
number of states, including North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts; the 
screening criteria used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; and the regulations for Veterans 
Administration loans provide an array of anti-predatory lending standards on which 
screening standards could be modeled.  Those standards include limitations on abusive 
prepayment penalties, loan flipping schemes, asset-based lending, and balloon clauses. Id. at 
1366-80.  
 218. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 109, at 79.  For a cogent description of mortgage fraud 
schemes, see U.S. Department of Justice, Financial Crimes Report to the Public D1-D12 
(May 2005). 
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signs of an inflated appraisal, raising suspicions of property flipping or 
appraisal fraud.219  Automation can also check for other types of fraud.  A 
borrower’s identity can be confirmed through an online search.  A database 
maintained by Mortgage Asset Research Inc. lists past participants in 
mortgage fraud.220  The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) uses a “Neighborhood Watch” website to screen out originators who 
have histories of making Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured 
loans with high default rates.221  CoreLogic issues a scorecard ranking 
every mortgage broker and appraiser on the past quality of their loans.222  
Automatic retrieval of records on loans by the same lender to the same 
borrower can be instrumental in uncovering loan flipping.  These automated 
anti-fraud safeguards are powerful because they can be applied to every 
loan in a loan pool. 
A new insurance product partners fraud detection programs with fraud 
insurance.223  The Prieston Group (TPG) performs due diligence review of 
lenders and certifies those that have adopted best practices.224  TPG also 
provides various services to assist lenders in preventing and detecting 
fraud.225  As part of the package, TPG provides fraud insurance that 
follows loans when they are sold or securitized.226  Such products can 
protect investors from the risk of fraud that may be difficult to detect.227
Manual inspection can help detect other types of loan fraud.  For 
example, such inspection can detect whited-out information on loan 
applications, a telltale sign of fraud.  In inspections of no- or low-
documentation loan files, Fitch has discovered documents with income and 
asset information blacked out.  The inference is that the borrowers’ income 
or assets were too low to qualify for a conventional loan.  Due to these and 
similar fraud concerns, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
advises lenders to inspect manually a sample of their loan files, particularly 
for loans that were sold by a broker or processed by inexperienced workers 
or temporary employees.  Manual checks can also be used to verify Social 
Security numbers and assets and down payments.228
 219. See Erick Bergquist, Identifying Soft Spots in Fight Against Fraud, Am. Banker, 
Sept. 27, 2004, at 7; Jody Shenn, Freddie Adds Suspicious-Valuation Alerts to LP, Am. 
Banker, Oct. 22, 2004, at 7. 
 220. See Shenn, supra note 114, at 8M. 
 221. See HUD, Enhancements to the Neighborhood Watch Early Warning System, 
Mortgagee Letter 2002-15 (July 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.hudclips.org/sub_nonhud/cgi/nph-brs.cgi?d=MLET&s1=02-
15[no]&SECT1=TXTHLB&SECT5=MLET&u=./hudclips.cgi&p=1&r=1&f=G 
 222. Roundtable, supra note 168, at 12. 
 223. See Jody Shenn, Fraud-Guard Venders Team Up, Am. Banker, Oct. 19, 2004, at 12. 
 224. The Prieston Group, http://www.priestongroup.com/app/public/lenders.jsp (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. The Prieston Group, TPG Mortgage Assurance Solution, available at 
http://www.priestongroup.com/app/public/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2007). 
 228. See Roundtable, supra note 168; Shenn, supra note 114, at 6A. 
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When fraud slips undetected through due diligence, often it is possible 
for trustees to detect it later through post-closing monitoring.  In the closing 
documents, lenders can be required to notify trustees of any complaints, 
government investigations, or enforcement orders involving their lending 
practices.  Similarly, those contracts can give trustees the right to perform 
spot audits of loans when red flags of lending abuse appear post-sale.   
Screening can be difficult when anti-predatory lending standards are 
vague.  Examples include prohibitions on asset-based lending and 
refinancings with no tangible net benefit to the borrower that do not provide 
objective guidelines for determining compliance.  Despite the difficulties 
these types of standards present, rating agencies have devised ways of 
rating loans from jurisdictions with imprecise lending standards.229  It is 
also possible to devise objective measures to determine compliance with 
vague standards.  The Veterans Administration, for V.A. loans, uses two 
quantitative tests—a debt-to-income ratio and a residual income test—to 
guard against asset-based lending.230  Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board, 
in the regulations implementing HOEPA, regulates loan flipping by 
prohibiting a lender and any assignee from refinancing a HOEPA loan with 
another HOEPA loan within one year from closing.231  Both of these 
standards are objective and thus capable of detection through automated 
compliance systems. 
4.  Tailoring Screening to the TBA and 144A Markets 
The to-be-announced and Rule 144A markets present unique obstacles to 
screening, but these obstacles are not insurmountable.  Because these 
markets do not contemplate pre-sale screening, due diligence could take 
place post-sale.  In a TBA offering, the lender and/or the trustee can do 
automated screening of loans immediately before loans are added to the 
loan pool.  Similarly, in a Rule 144A offering, screening could be 
performed after the closing. 
Nevertheless, screening poses a practical concern in both markets.  In the 
TBA market, post-closing review means that investors lack the leverage 
they had before closing to walk away from the deal.  When TBA offerings 
are structured as public offerings, the lenders have to provide disclosures 
and representations and warranties about the quality and legality of the loan 
 229. For example, S&P looks for factors mitigating aggressive enforcement of statutes, 
such as laws limiting recovery to a pattern or practice of violations, scienter requirements, an 
objective safe harbor, the litigation history of the law, or high proof or procedural hurdles to 
recovery.  S&P will require more credit enhancements absent such mitigating factors. See 
S&P, supra note 135; see also Press Release, S&P, New Criteria Implemented for Including 
Anti-Predatory Lending Law Lns in U.S. Rtd SF Trans (May 13, 2004) [hereinafter S&P, 
New Criteria Implemented]. 
 230. See 38 C.F.R. § 36.4337 (2006). 
 231. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2006).  While the rule recognizes an exception for 
refinancings that are “in the borrower’s interest,” essentially the one-year rule creates a 
rebuttable presumption that refinancings within one year violate HOEPA. Id. 
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pool.  With those safeguards in hand, the trustee at least has the legal right 
to reject substandard loans from the loan pool.  The real issue, then, is the 
transaction costs of enforcing those safeguards. 
Matters are dicier in Rule 144A offerings.  There, investors not only lack 
the leverage to walk away, but do not benefit from any pre-sale disclosures 
or binding representations and warranties.  Without those deal protections, 
investors have no contractual guarantee of the minimum quality of loans to 
be included in the loan pool.  While Rule 144A investors and trustees could 
insist, after-the-fact, that any illegal loans be removed from the loan pool, 
their weak contract rights would undercut their bargaining position and 
likely result in prolonged negotiations to no effect.  As we discuss in the 
next section, carefully tailored provisions imposing assignee liability for 
predatory lending would arm Rule 144A and other investors with the 
leverage they need to insist on adequate disclosures and binding 
representations and warranties. 
B.  A Proposal for Assignee Liability in Residential Mortgage 
Securitizations 
1.  Due Diligence 
The time has come to adopt a national legal standard for due diligence in 
residential mortgage securitizations and wholesale purchases of home loans.  
We propose a due diligence standard with the following contours:  
(i)  Loan-Level Review for Actual Compliance:  Due diligence should 
include review of every loan in a loan pool for compliance with substantive 
screening standards.  Lenders and underwriters would have the choice of 
manual or automated screening.  Most lenders, particularly larger lenders, 
would likely opt for automated screening.  All residential loan pools would 
be subject to loan-level review in full, whether those pools contain prime or 
subprime loans. 
(ii)  Manual Screening for Other Signs of Fraud:  Due diligence should 
further require manual screening of a random sample of loan files for other 
indicators of fraud.  This review would be in addition to the automated or 
manual review just described.  Indicators of fraud could include the 
whiting-out of critical underwriting information, inconsistent information, 
and suspect or absent documentation.  The random sample should be 
sufficiently large to support statistical inferences within specified tolerances 
about the absence or presence of the type of fraud tested for in the loan 
pool. 
(iii)  Review For Facial Compliance:  Before the advent of automated 
screening, due diligence by underwriters and rating agencies traditionally 
consisted of reviewing originators’ loan products, sales and training 
manuals, underwriting policies, broker selection, oversight, compensation 
policies, and form loan contracts to verify compliance with consumer 
protection and lending laws.  Such due diligence continues to remain 
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important.  Indeed, in the Lehman Brothers case, FAMCO’s scripted sales 
materials allegedly coached FAMCO’s loan officers on how to make 
fraudulent sales pitches.232  Accordingly, due diligence should retain 
review for facial compliance.  In addition, this phase should review all 
lawsuits filed, other borrower complaints, and government investigations of 
or actions taken against the lender for alleged predatory lending practices. 
(iv)  Determine Outcomes:  A well-functioning due diligence system sets 
benchmarks for how to respond to loans found to violate the screening 
criteria.  In the event of isolated violations, any loan that violated the 
screening criteria would either have to be rejected from the loan pool or 
have the defect promptly corrected.  Higher volumes of violations would 
require rejection of the entire loan pool and cancellation of the sale.233
(v)  Adequate Representations and Warranties and Recourse Clauses 
Enforceable by the Trust:  In addition to ensuring screening, lenders should 
be required to provide representations and warranties that all loans in the 
loan pool comply with all applicable laws, including the nationwide 
screening criteria.  All representations and warranties should run to, and be 
enforceable by, the trustee on behalf of the securitized trust.234
(vi)  Post-closing Monitoring:  Due diligence should further require loan 
originators, loan aggregators, underwriters, and servicers of residential 
mortgage loan pools to provide written notice to the trustee of any borrower 
complaints, lawsuits, subpoenas, notices of government investigations, and 
enforcement orders involving any loans in the loan pool.  In addition, 
trustees should be required to investigate lenders whose loans prove to have 
higher-than-average default, prepayment, and/or foreclosure rates than 
loans with comparable risk.235
 232. Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 657-58 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2003) (findings of fact).  
 233. HUD has adopted this approach for Federal Housing Administration-insured loans. 
See Due Diligence in Acquiring Loans, HUD Mortgagee Letter 2002-21, at 5 (Sept. 26, 




 234. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Board already require 
these contractual enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Lender Letter No. 03-00, 
supra note 143; Federal Housing Finance Board, Advisory Bull. 2005-AB-08 (Aug. 25, 
2005), available at http://www.fhfb.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=4201; Freddie Mac Promotes 
Consumer Choice With New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy, supra note 143; 
Freddie Mac Will No Longer Invest in Subprime Mortgages with Prepayment Penalty Terms 
Greater Than Three Years, supra note 143; cf. HUD, supra note 233, at 5-6 (noting that best 
practices involve such provisions). 
 235. Post-purchase monitoring can effectively detect unusual patterns among loan pools.  
For example, in 2005, Freddie Mac observed unusually high prepayment rates on loans sold 
by National City Mortgage. Eric Dash, Freddie Mac Purchased and Sold Faulty Loans, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 14, 2005, at C3.  Elevated prepayment rates can be evidence that originators are 
engaging in loan flipping. Id.  Further investigation revealed that one broker was responsible 
for the questionable loans. Id. 
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We recognize that these standards form the outer parameters for 
workable due diligence and monitoring.  Accordingly, we recommend that 
a federal agency be empowered to work out the nuts-and-bolts details of 
due diligence and monitoring through a rulemaking proceeding in which 
consumer advocates, lenders, and secondary market participants provide 
input into the types of controls that would best detect and deter predatory 
lending.  Furthermore, that agency should be empowered to update due 
diligence and monitoring standards as circumstances and technology 
evolve. 
2.  Assignee Liability 
Our assignee liability proposal aims to achieve three objectives.  First, it 
would cause capital markets to internalize harm to borrowers from 
financing abusive loans.  Second, it would restore the full panoply of 
remedies to borrowers that they had before their loans were securitized.  
Finally, it would foster certainty by establishing bright-line rules enabling 
assignees to estimate their potential liability for any predatory lending 
claims. 
a.  Which Claims Would Be Subject to Assignee Liability? 
Although borrowers can harness an array of claims against originators for 
predatory lending, we propose extending assignee liability only to specific 
causes of action.  These causes of action are:  (1) common law tort claims, 
such as fraud and improvident lending; (2) contract claims such as 
unconscionability; and (3) claims under state and local anti-predatory 
lending laws.  In addition, we would impose liability on assignees for 
violations of a national suitability standard that we previously proposed.236  
This standard, which is akin to the suitability doctrine in securities 
regulation, would prohibit originators from making unsuitable loans to 
borrowers. 
At this point, we do not propose altering or expanding assignee liability 
under federal or state anti-discrimination, disclosure, or unfair and 
deceptive trade practices laws.  Doing so would require amending a 
multitude of statutes.  In addition, caution suggests that this foray into 
federal assignee liability laws not be sweeping.  After there has been time 
for adequate study of the impact of our proposal, policy-makers could 
consider harmonizing assignee liability standards for discrimination, 
disclosure, and consumer protection claims to reflect the expanding class of 
market participants who should be liable under the statutes. 
 236. Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1317-39. 
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Finally, our proposal would operate as a floor, not a ceiling, and thus 
would not preempt any stricter assignee liability provisions under state or 
federal lending laws,237 such as HOEPA. 
b.  Remedies Available Against Assignees 
Trusts that complied with the due diligence and monitoring standards 
outlined above would be liable for the same declaratory and equitable relief 
that borrowers could seek against their original lenders or brokers, 
including rescission and reformation.  Borrowers could also obtain 
compensatory relief to the extent their damages were calculable.  Thus, we 
would permit recovery of relocation expenses, lost equity, excess fees, 
interest payments, and late payment fees, but not recovery against assignees 
for emotional distress.  We would also permit prevailing borrowers to 
recover attorneys’ fees.  Importantly, trusts that employed our due diligence 
methods would not be subject to punitive damages or statutory penalties 
that were punitive in nature.  This limitation would apply even if the 
underlying cause of action permitted punitive remedies against brokers or 
lenders.  Conversely, trusts that failed to check all due diligence criteria 
would be liable for treble damages or other inflation-adjusted numeric 
statutory penalties, whichever were greater.  In no case could indeterminate 
punitive damages or penalties be assessed against assignees. 
Our liability proposal is subject to three provisos.  First, assignees could 
not escape liability by returning the abusive loan in question to the lender 
under a recourse or other comparable clause and then raising the defense 
that they no longer owned the loan.238  Second, borrowers would not need 
to demonstrate a pattern or practice of weak controls across multiple 
securitizations in order to assert a claim or defense against an assignee.  Lax 
due diligence in their own securitization would be enough to support treble 
damages or a statutory penalty.  Lastly, none of the limitations on the 
claims that borrowers could assert against assignees or the relief to which 
they would be entitled would apply to claims against brokers or lenders. 
c.  Comparison to Existing Assignee Liability Provisions 
Assignee liability for predatory lending already exists on a limited scale.  
The federal government, through HOEPA, and numerous states and cities 
have adopted anti-predatory lending laws that contain assignee liability 
provisions.  Our proposal differs from these laws in several respects.  We 
contend our proposal offers a more effective approach to assignee liability. 
First, our proposal would extend assignee liability to all abusive loans 
nationwide, including loans that do not meet the HOEPA or state law 
definitions of “high-cost” loans.  Second, our proposal would enable rating 
 237. See Azmy, supra note 70, at 390-404 (discussing how state lending laws provide 
opportunities to assess the effect of various approaches to regulating lending practices). 
 238. The assignees could implead originators, however. 
~9555358 3/19/2007  3:20 PM 
2007] TURNING A BLIND EYE 153 
 
agencies to predict potential assignee liability and thus allay secondary 
market concerns about indeterminate relief.  Finally, our due diligence 
provisions would impose the greatest liability on the assignees least willing 
to police lenders. 
HOEPA and most state and local assignee liability laws apply only to so-
called “high-cost” loans that exceed specific interest rate or points and fees 
triggers.  HOEPA only applies to refinance loans239 where the annual 
percentage rate at origination exceeds the yield on Treasury securities of 
comparable maturity plus eight percent on first-lien loans or where the total 
points and fees exceed eight percent of the total loan amount or $547 (in 
2007), whichever is greater.240  Lenders who make HOEPA loans are 
limited or precluded from making loans with balloon payments, prepayment 
penalties, negative amortization, and other potentially onerous terms.241  
Assignees of HOEPA loans are liable for 
all claims and defenses . . . the consumer could assert against the creditor 
of the mortgage, unless [the assignees] demonstrate, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that a reasonable person exercising ordinary due 
diligence, could not determine, based on the documentation required by 
this [subchapter], the itemization of the amount financed, and other 
disclosure of disbursements that the mortgage [was a HOEPA loan].242
Many state and local anti-predatory lending statutes and ordinances track 
HOEPA’s structure.  Some have adopted HOEPA’s triggers.243  Most other 
state and local laws have modified the criteria for covered loans, including 
lower triggers,244 broader definitions of the fees trigger,245 and imposing 
maximum loan amounts in the definition of high-cost loans.246  Many have 
also enlarged the list of prohibited practices for “covered” loans.247
Just as the triggers and other provisions in state and local anti-predatory 
lending laws take a range of approaches, so do state assignee liability laws.  
Some states insulate assignees from all liability for abusive loans.  Among 
states that do permit assignee liability, most impose liability only for “high-
cost” loans, as defined by statute.  The conditions under which assignees 
may be liable for abusive lending and the remedies available against them 
vary widely.  Some laws exempt assignees from liability if they engage in 
due diligence to keep “high-cost” loans out of loan pools.  Others only cap 
the liability of assignees who engage in due diligence.  Depending on the 
jurisdiction, assignees who fail to meet the laws’ due diligence standards 
 239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(i), (w), (bb) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(2) (2006). 
 240. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa)(1)-(aa)(4) (2000); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006); 
Truth in Lending, 71 Fed. Reg. 46388 (2006); see generally Eugene J. Kelley et al., An 
Overview of HOEPA, Old and New, 59 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 203 (2005). 
 241. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000). 
 242. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1) (2000). 
 243. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 9-A, § 8-103(1)(F-1) (1997). 
 244. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-21A-3(H), (L) (Supp. 2003). 
 245. See, e.g., 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 137/10 (Supp. 2006). 
 246. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 23-53-103(5)(A) (Supp. 2005). 
 247. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 360.100(2) (Supp. 2005). 
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may face very limited damages or indeterminate punitive sanctions and 
damages awards.  Still other jurisdictions have no due diligence standard 
and restrict the scope of assignee liability.  Finally, a couple of cities have 
passed ordinances that imposed strict liability on assignees with no safe 
harbors or limitations on available remedies. 
California’s Financial Code explicitly exempts assignees from any claims 
arising under its law restricting abusive loan terms so long as they are 
holders in due course or “chartered by Congress to engage in secondary 
mortgage market transactions.”248  In contrast, Georgia provides assignees 
with a safe harbor for reasonable due diligence.  Under its state anti-
predatory lending statute, borrowers with “high-cost” loans can bring any 
claims and raise any defenses against assignees that they could raise against 
loan originators, 
unless the purchaser or holder demonstrates, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the purchaser or holder exercised reasonable due diligence 
at the time of purchase of the home loans, or within a reasonable time 
thereafter, intended to prevent the purchaser or holder from purchasing or 
taking assignment of high-cost home loans.249
Conversely, if assignees fail to engage in the prescribed due diligence, 
borrowers can obtain equitable relief, the balance of the amount due on 
their loan, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.250
Another approach is to allow limited assignee liability even when 
assignees engage in due diligence.  This is the approach New Jersey took in 
its Home Ownership Security Act.  The law insulates assignees from almost 
all liability for “high-cost” loans if they meet due diligence requirements 
designed to screen out “high-cost” loans.251  The law does, however, 
provide two exceptions.  The first permits borrowers to assert claims 
against all assignees, even those that engage in due diligence, for violations 
of the Home Ownership Security Act for the amount “required to reduce or 
extinguish the borrower’s liability under the home loan plus amounts 
required to recover costs including reasonable attorney’s fees.”252  Second, 
“at any time during the term of a high-cost home loan after an action to 
 248. Cal. Fin. Code § 4979.8 (Supp. 2007). 
 249. Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-6(b) (2004); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 23-53-
105(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2005); D.C. Code § 26-1153.05(a) (2005); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
137/135(d)(1) (2006).  Taking a different tack, in Kentucky, assignee liability applies only if 
“the violation for which the action or proceeding is brought is apparent on the face of the 
disclosure or the underlying promissory note.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 360.100(1)(b) (Supp. 
2005); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598D.050, 598D.110.2 (2004) (holding assignees liable if 
they “willfully engage[d] in any unfair lending practice described in this chapter in 
connection with a home loan”). 
 250. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-6(c) (2004).  Other jurisdictions similarly limit the 
relief available against assignees. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 26-1153.05 (2005); Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. 815/137-135(d) (2006); Ark. Code Ann. § 23-53-105(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2005). 
 251. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46: 10B-27(b) (Supp. 2006).  Other states have enacted similar 
statutory schemes. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-21A-11(A) (Supp. 2003); Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 183C, § 15 (Supp. 2006). 
 252. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46: 10B-27(c) (Supp. 2006). 
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collect on the home loan or foreclose on the collateral securing the home 
loan has been initiated or the debt arising from the home loan has been 
accelerated or the home loan has become 60 days in default,” borrowers can 
raise any defense, claim, or counterclaim against assignees.253  Again, 
borrowers’ recovery is limited to the “amounts required to reduce or 
extinguish the borrower’s liability” and attorneys’ fees.254  Assignees who 
do not satisfy New Jersey’s due diligence requirements are liable for the full 
range of claims and defenses which borrowers could assert against loan 
originators.255
New York does not require due diligence to screen for high-cost loans.  
Rather, it imposes assignee liability in limited situations and restricts the 
relief to which borrowers are entitled.  Borrowers can “assert any claims in 
recoupment and defenses to payment” arising under the state’s high-cost 
home loan law “that the borrower could assert against the original 
lender.”256  This provision only applies to an “action by an assignee to 
enforce a loan against a borrower in default more than sixty days or in 
foreclosure.”257
The cities of Los Angeles and Oakland attempted to paint assignee 
liability with a broad brush by passing ordinances holding assignees liable 
for any claims arising from high-cost loans that could be asserted against 
loan originators.258  The ordinances had no due diligence or other safe 
harbor provisions and no limits on the liability to which assignees could be 
exposed.  The California Supreme Court has held that state law preempts 
these ordinances.259
While each of these approaches has laudable features, they all suffer from 
infirmities.  First, it is too easy for lenders to write loans beneath the 
triggers for high-cost loans and thus evade the reach of anti-predatory 
lending laws.  A recent nationwide study of state anti-predatory lending 
laws, which found evidence that mortgage lenders had switched from fixed-
rate to adjustable-rate loans following passage of those laws, suggests that 
lenders are attempting such evasion.260  As part of the switch to adjustable-
rate products, the recent spate of interest-only and option adjustable-rate 
mortgages made without regard for the borrowers’ ability to repay so 
 253. Id. § 46: 10B-27(c)(2). 
 254. Id. § 46: 10B-27(c).  Similarly, Arkansas allows claims against assignees who 
engage in due diligence, but only in the form of offset actions in default or foreclosure 
actions. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-53-105 (Supp. 2005). 
 255. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46: 10B-27(b); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 15(a) 
(authorizing unrestricted liability on assignees who do not adhere to state’s due diligence 
requirements); Ind. Code Ann. § 24-9-5-1 (2006) (same). 
 256. N.Y. Banking Law § 6-l(13) (McKinney Supp. 2007). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Oakland, Cal. Code, Ch. 5.33.070 (2006); Los Angeles, Cal. Municipal Code, Art. 1, 
§ 162.07. 
 259. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005). 
 260. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost 
of Credit 21-23, 26 (Research Div., Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 
2006-022A, 2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-022.pdf. 
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alarmed federal banking regulators in 2006 that they issued a guidance 
curbing abusive practices in nontraditional mortgages.261   
There are also signs that predatory lending is starting to infiltrate the 
prime market.  For instance, the number of foreclosure starts for prime 
loans in Chicago in 2005 exceeded the number of foreclosure starts that 
year for subprime and high-cost loans combined.262 This suggests that 
predatory lending laws should not focus solely on high-cost loans. 
Second, when laws fully immunize assignees who engage in due 
diligence from liability, they reap the benefits of the pricing distortions and 
market imperfections that permeate the subprime market.  In contrast, laws 
like New Jersey’s that impose limited liability on assignees who engage in 
due diligence force assignees to internalize some costs that affected 
borrowers would otherwise bear. 
Our third concern goes to appropriate relief against assignees who do not 
perform due diligence.  Current remedies range from very limited relief to 
unbounded compensatory and punitive damages.  The former provides 
insufficient incentives to police lenders.  The latter are so indeterminate that 
rating agencies cannot estimate potential assignee liability and therefore the 
needed level of credit enhancements.263   
The laws that do not have due diligence safe harbors have their own 
limitations.  The law should treat assignees who engage in due diligence 
more favorably.  This satisfies notions of fairness and forces the worst 
actors to absorb the most costs. 
Our proposal solves the problems presented by existing legislation by:  
(1) eliminating triggers for assignee liability for abusive loans; (2) having 
clear standards that make it possible for assignees to predict the potential 
bases for and extent of liability; (3) requiring all assignees to internalize 
some of the costs that securitization imposes on borrowers; (4) making the 
extent of assignee liability depend on adequately screening loans; and (5) 
providing quantifiable damages that will enable rating agencies to evaluate 
the risks associated with loan pools. 
IX.  A RESPONSE TO CRITICS 
Due diligence standards and assignee liability are controversial 
propositions in the residential mortgage market.  In this section, we respond 
to criticisms of such proposals. 
 261. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 
58609 (Oct. 4, 2006). 
 262. David C. Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2006 6, 8 (2006), (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review), available at http://www.ntic-
us.org/documents/ChicagoForeclosureUpdate2006-revised_000.pdf. 
 263. See S&P, Standard & Poor’s Addresses New Jersey Predatory Lending Law (May 2, 
2003). 
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A.  Our Due Diligence Proposal Does Not Espouse Radical Changes to the 
Secondary Market 
In all modesty, there is nothing new about our due diligence standards.  
To the contrary, two of the most important purchasers in the conventional 
secondary mortgage market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have adopted 
similar standards.  Both government-sponsored entities (GSEs) already 
require lenders who sell them loans to screen out loans with specified 
predatory features, regardless of the interest rates on those loans or whether 
the predatory features are legal.264  The market coverage of such due 
diligence is impressive:  The two GSEs together purchase a large portion of 
subprime home loans, amounting to 43.7 percent of total subprime 
securitized issues in 2004.265
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made their 
first forays into subprime territory, buying the best, A- subprime loans.  In 
April 2000, as predatory lending concerns began to mount, Fannie Mae 
issued guidelines to sellers of loans mandating screening criteria to protect 
Fannie Mae from buying predatory loans.  Those guidelines require lenders 
to use Fannie Mae’s automated underwriting program to avoid steering of 
prime-eligible customers to high-priced loans, prohibit loans made without 
regard to the borrower’s ability to pay, and limit points and fees to five 
percent of principal.266  Freddie Mac issued comparable guidelines to 
sellers and servicers in December 2000.267  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
are reputedly aggressive in rejecting predatory loans and in requiring 
lenders to repurchase such loans if later evidence of predatory lending crops 
up. 
The two GSEs are not the only federal entities that require review of 
purchased loans.  The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
stipulates that national banks that buy home loans require intermediaries 
and originators to conduct proper due diligence to avoid purchasing 
predatory loans.268  Similarly, HUD has adopted best practices guidelines 
 264. See, e.g., supra note 143; GAO, supra note 109, at 79-81.  HUD regulations can or 
do deny credit to the GSEs toward their affordable housing goals for HOEPA loans and 
mortgages that are “contrary to good lending practices,” contain “unacceptable terms or 
conditions,” or “result[] from unacceptable practices.” 24 C.F.R. §§ 81.2, 81.16(c)(12)-
(c)(13) (2005).  Impermissible loans include loans where lenders fail to report repayments by 
borrowers to credit agencies, asset-based loans, and loans involving steering, excessive fees, 
abusive prepayment penalties, or prepaid single-premium credit life insurance. Id.; see also 
Regulatory Amendments to Strengthen Prevention of Predatory Lending Practices, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 33144 (June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pr. 81); Prohibition of Property 
Flipping in HUD’s Single Family Mortgage Insurance Programs, 71 Fed. Reg. 33138 (June 
7, 2006) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 115) (applying property flipping restrictions to the 
GSEs). 
 265. See S&P, supra note 175, at 2. 
 266. See Fannie Mae, Lender Letter No. 03-00, supra note 143. 
 267. See Freddie Mac’s Stance Against Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 143. 
 268. The OCC requires such guidelines by national banks to impose minimum 
underwriting requirements, appraisal criteria, and standards on total interest and fees, 
including provisions on “maximum rates, points, and other charges, and the use of overages 
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governing due diligence in the purchase and servicing of loans insured by 
the FHA.269  In the most recent example of this trend, in 2005, the Federal 
Housing Finance Board instructed the Federal Home Loan Banks to adopt 
uniform anti-predatory lending guidelines for purchases of mortgages by 
Federal Home Loan Bank members.270
Already, substantial portions of the secondary market are subject to due 
diligence or are encouraged by federal regulators to adopt best practices.  
Nevertheless, much of the private-label resale market continues to escape 
those guidelines.  As a result, numerous predatory loans still slip into 
securitizations. 
B.  Our Proposal Will Not Drive Out Legitimate Credit 
Assignee liability proposals for residential mortgages often face 
opposition on grounds that they will cause a retraction in available credit to 
underserved borrowers.  This criticism is susceptible to testing.  Over the 
last few years, numerous states have passed anti-predatory lending laws.271  
Two noteworthy empirical studies with nationwide scope have assessed the 
impact of specific state laws on the volume of subprime credit. 
Economists Giang Ho and Anthony Pennington-Cross have analyzed the 
impact of state and local anti-predatory lending laws on subprime 
lending.272  They found that “predatory lending laws have only a modest 
impact on the cost of credit.”273  In addition, they concluded that “the 
and yield-spread premiums, structured to avoid providing an incentive to originate loans 
with predatory or abusive characteristics.” See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. C.III.E.3 (2006); see 
also Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans, 
OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3 (Feb. 21, 2003). 
 269. The HUD guidelines recommend loan-level review designed to reject loans 
involving property flips, appraisal frauds, excessive points and fees, and credit extensions 
without regard to the borrower’s ability to pay. See HUD, supra note 233. 
 270. In drafting uniform guidelines, the Banks are to consult similar guidelines of the 
GSEs, HUD, federal regulators, and large financial institutions.  In addition to barring 
purchase of illegal loans, the guidelines must address the purchase of HOEPA loans and 
loans with certain predatory features, such as prepaid single premium credit life insurance, 
prepayment penalties with extended terms, and mandatory arbitration clauses. See Federal 
Housing Finance Board, supra note 234. 
 271. See generally Azmy, supra note 70, at 371-76; S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law 
Update (Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update]; S&P, supra 
note 135; S&P, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws:  Standard & Poor’s Explains its 
Approach (Apr. 15, 2003) [hereinafter S&P, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws]. 
 272. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory 
Lending Laws on the Flow of Subprime Credit 50 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working 
Paper No. 2006-009A, February 2006), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-009.pdf. 
 273. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost 
of Credit 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No 2006-022A, 2006), 
available at http: //research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-022.pdf.  In a press release dated 
February 1, 2005, S&P announced that it had completed a study showing that the capital 
markets only financed $87 million in high-cost loans in 2004 and surmised that anti-
predatory lending legislation had limited either the origination or securitization of such 
loans.  However, S&P did not provide comparative data for prior years and has not made the 
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typical law has little impact on the flow of subprime credit as measured by 
loan origination and application.”274  In fact, state anti-predatory lending 
laws with lower triggers (and thus broader coverage) resulted in increased 
loan originations and applications.  In their opinion, broader anti-predatory 
lending laws may alleviate consumers’ concerns that they could fall prey to 
predatory lending and make them more confident about applying for 
subprime mortgage loans.  “In other words,” they observed, “the demand 
for subprime credit can actually increase when a predatory lending law is 
enacted.”275
A second study by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) of 
securitized subprime loans reported comparable findings.276  The study 
compared subprime loan volumes in twenty-eight states with anti-predatory 
lending laws to volumes in states with no such laws (designated the control 
states), after controlling for time effects plus economic and demographic 
variables.  When the latter variables were held constant, twenty of the 
twenty-eight states experienced no change in volume, six had higher 
volumes, and two had lower volumes, relative to the control states.  
Furthermore, Georgia—one of the two states with reduced volumes—
experienced an increase in subprime loans without prohibited loan terms.277  
Finally, the CRL study found that nominal subprime interest rates remained 
the same or dropped in almost all states with anti-predatory lending laws, 
compared with the control states.278
Experience under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule abolishing 
the holder-in-due-course rule for consumer loans, including home loans 
used to finance goods and services, also suggests that fears of a credit 
drought are overstated.279  When the FTC promulgated its rule in 1976, 
study publicly available. See Press Release, S&P, Study Shows Capital Markets Not 
Financing High Cost U.S. Mortgage Loan Originations (Feb. 1, 2005).  A separate study, 
commissioned by the National Home Equity Mortgage Association and the National 
Association of Mortgage Brokers, found that New Jersey lenders planned to cut their 
subprime cash-out refinance and home improvement lending by sixty-nine percent after 
passage of New Jersey’s assignee liability law. See Richard F. DeMong, The Impact of the 
New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review), available at 
http://www.mbaa.org/images/namb/documents/PDF/2004_03_26_nj_results.pdf. The 
NHEMA/NAMB study, however, was based solely on self-reports by lenders and brokers 
and its quantitative estimates were calculated before New Jersey amended its law to soften 
its provisions.  Other scholars have pointed out that a drop in lending volumes does not 
necessarily harm social welfare, and in fact enhances it when the reduction is mostly limited 
to predatory loans.  See Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, 
Assessing the Impact of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law, 15 Housing Pol’y Debate 
573 (2004). 
 274. Ho & Pennington-Cross, supra note 273, at 47. 
 275. Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory Lending 
Laws on the Flow of Subprime Credit, 60 J. Urb. Econ. 210, 226 (2006). 
 276. Li & Ernst, supra note 92. 
 277. See id. at 13-14. 
 278. See id. at 15-17. 
 279. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2005). 
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lenders predicted dire effects on the availability of consumer credit.  Time 
proved them wrong.  Instead, “suppliers of consumer goods and credit, at 
least the honest ones . . . accommodated themselves easily to the FTC 
[Rule], with only a slight drop in the amount of consumer credit 
available.”280
Finally, there is compelling anecdotal evidence that state anti-predatory 
lending laws have not had an adverse impact on the flow of subprime 
credit.  After surveying lenders in states with anti-predatory lending laws, 
including those with assignee liability provisions, Morgan Stanley issued a 
report in 2002 stating:  
We recently conducted a “channel check” among branch managers of 
several major consumer-finance lenders.  We expected to hear that new 
predatory lending laws were crimping growth and driving capacity out of 
the margin.  Our thinking was that volume might slow, but that improving 
margins would offer a partial offset.  Instead, we discovered that, at least 
according to the 280 branch managers with whom we conducted detailed 
telephonic surveys, new laws, and the changes in lending practices that 
have resulted, are not hurting growth.  On the contrary, we heard from a 
number of branch managers that the changes they have made to comply 
with the new lending laws may have increased origination volume, as 
potential customers feel more at ease with the loan process. . . . 
Even the toughest new laws, in states like North Carolina, for example, do 
not seem to be affecting branch volumes.281
C.  Rating Agencies Do Rate Loans Subject to Damages Caps for Assignee 
Liability 
Some critics have claimed that rating agencies cannot and will not rate 
subprime loans originated in states with assignee liability provisions.  The 
reality belies this claim.  Rating agencies are rating subprime issues from 
most states with assignee liability laws.282  Their willingness to rate issues 
from these states typically hinges on whether assignees’ potential damages 
can be quantified.  In this regard, S&P has stated:  “Standard & Poor’s 
 280. Eggert, supra note 116, at 429 n.305 (citing William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan, 
The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-Due Course Doctrine on the Commercialization of 
Innovative Consumer Products, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 325, 338 & n.51 (1984)) (describing how 
The Wharton Forecasting Institute estimated that only a 5.5% reduction in the volume of 
consumer credit in 1976 was caused by the FTC’s rule); see also White & Summers, supra 
note 72, at 508 (“It now appears that [arguments that the holder-in-due-course rule was 
essential to the free flow of credit] were incorrect”; abolition of the rule for certain consumer 
transactions “caused barely a ripple on the consumer credit pond”). 
 281. Morgan Stanley, Channel Check:  Surprisingly Strong Subprime Growth 2-3 
(August 1, 2002), available at http://butera-andrews.com/legislative-
updates/directory/Media/other/MS-SubPrime.pdf. 
 282. See, e.g., S&P, supra note 135; S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update, supra 
note 271; S&P, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 271.  For a discussion of the 
application of the credit enhancement criteria, see infra notes 283-301 and accompanying 
text. 
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believes that when the risk associated with violating an anti-predatory 
lending law is quantifiable, then Standard & Poor’s will allow loans 
governed by that law in its rated transactions if the risk is supported by the 
appropriate credit enhancement.”283
S&P has been able to quantify the following elements of damages:  
unpaid loan balance, principal, interest, and fees paid to date, double or 
treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.  In addition, S&P is able to 
quantify the cost of loan rescission.284
In a handful of controversial situations, S&P has refused to rate high-cost 
loans in states that enacted assignee liability laws with indeterminate 
damages provisions.285  The most celebrated instance was in Georgia, 
which passed a strict assignee liability law in 2002.  Thereupon, S&P 
announced it would refuse to rate all Georgia home loans subject to the law, 
after which the Georgia legislature amended the law to cap damages on 
high-cost loans.286  With passage of the amendment, S&P agreed to 
“review transactions that propose to include [Georgia] high-cost loans on a 
case-by-case basis.”287
Currently, S&P refuses to rate loan pools containing high-cost loans 
governed by assignee liability laws in Indiana, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey on grounds that those laws create indeterminate damages exposure 
and thus do not permit S&P to calculate the maximum exposure per loan for 
securitized trusts.288  Our assignee liability proposal, unlike the Indiana, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey statutes, is limited to quantifiable exposure 
and thus is amenable to rating. 
 283. S&P, supra note 135.  Because S&P has taken the lead in developing ratings 
methods for high-cost loans from states with assignee liability, this discussion focuses on 
S&P’s approach. 
 284. See S&P, Standard & Poor’s Implements Credit Enhancement Criteria and Revises 
Representation and Warranty Criteria for Including Anti-Predatory Lending Law Loans in 
U.S. Rated Structured Finance Transactions (May 13, 2004). 
 285. See generally Azmy, supra note 70, at 374-76; David Reiss, Subprime 
Standardization:  How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the 
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 985 (2006). 
 286. See Azmy, supra note 70, at 374-76; Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor’s To 
Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans (Jan. 16, 2003); compare Georgia Fair Lending 
Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 7-6A-1 to 7-6A-13 (West 2002) with Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-6 (West 
2004). 
 287. Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor’s Will Admit Georgia Mortgage Loans Into 
Rated Structured Finance Transactions (Mar. 11, 2003). 
 288. In certain cases, S&P will rate high-cost loans from Massachusetts originated by 
national banks, federal savings associations, and federal savings banks that enjoy federal 
preemption. See, e.g., S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update, supra note 271; see also 
Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor’s Eliminates Additional Credit Enhancement 
Requirements For Indiana Home Loans (Feb. 7, 2005) (but not Indiana high-cost loans); 
S&P, Standard & Poor’s Addresses Indiana Anti-Predatory Lending Law (Oct. 18, 2004); 
S&P, Standard & Poor’s Addresses Massachusetts’ Predatory Home Loan Practices Act 
(Sept. 20, 2004); S&P, New Criteria Implemented, supra note 229; S&P, supra note 284; 
S&P, supra note 263; Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor’s Permits Additional New 
Jersey Mortgage Loans Into Rated SF Transactions (Nov. 25, 2003). 
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D.  Our Proposal Will Not Make Legitimate Loans Unaffordable 
Critics of assignee liability also contend that proposals such as ours will 
render home loans uneconomical.  As we have demonstrated, the cost of 
due diligence is minimal, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the 
overall cost of originating a home loan.  The more significant cost 
consideration arises from the possibility that rating agencies might require 
additional credit enhancements in response to the increased liability 
exposure of trusts.  If they were large enough, credit enhancements could 
push up the price of loans.  As it turns out, there is scant evidence that S&P 
has required significant added credit enhancements in response to laws 
imposing assignee liability so long as there is an adequately capitalized 
lender, a well-crafted assignee liability law, and effective due diligence 
review. 
S&P officially takes the position that high-cost loans originated in states 
with quantifiable assignee liability laws require added credit 
enhancements.289  S&P, however, keeps the exact amount of credit 
enhancements required a mystery.290  Repeatedly, in public statements, 
S&P has trotted out estimates of the maximum legal exposure per loan 
(which S&P terms “loss severities”).  These loss severities vary by state and 
go as high as 275 percent of the original loan balance for “high-cost loans” 
that are originated in North Carolina and Kentucky.291  Obviously, if 
 289. S&P states that it requires elevated credit enhancements or their equivalent for 
certain high-cost or covered loans originated in Arkansas, Colorado, the District of 
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Ohio, and Oklahoma.  The same is true for home loans originated in Cleveland 
Heights and Toledo, Ohio, and HOEPA loans. See S&P, supra note 284. 
 290. See Erick Bergquist, Predator Laws:  S&P’s Awkward Position, Am. Banker, May 
18, 2004, at 1 (“S&P couches risk warnings on various loan types under the term of potential 
‘loss severity’—even in jurisdictions and categories where S&P says it would not require 
credit enhancements—but does not specify the actual credit enhancement requirement.”). 
 291. See Susan Barnes, Managing Director, S&P & Scott Mason, Director, S&P, 
PowerPoint presentation 14-16 (May 17, 2004); Susan Barnes, Managing Director, S&P, 
PowerPoint Presentation at the MBA Nat’l Secondary Market Conference and Expo:  
Evaluating Anti-Predatory Lending Laws:  S&P’s Approach 4 (Apr. 19, 2004); S&P, supra 
note 135; S&P, supra note 284.  For jurisdictions with assignee liability laws, S&P has 
estimated loss severities ranging from 37 percent of the original loan balance in Ohio to 275 
percent in North Carolina and Kentucky (both of which permit forfeiture of interest charges 
plus twice the interest paid, attorneys’ fees and costs). See S&P, supra note 284.  An S&P 
managing director explained how S&P would arrive at a 268 percent loss severity for a 30-
year fixed-rate home loan for $100,000 at 9.00 percent annual interest under a proposed 
Nevada law to impose treble damages liability on assignees (assuming that damage to the 
borrower would consist of all interest paid over the life of the loan):  
Conservatively assume that average life of a mortgage is 10 years 
Total interest paid on loan over 10 years is $85,984 
Assume 10% of the [unpaid principal balance] ($10,000 in this example) as attorney fees and 
costs 
$85,984 * 3 = $257,952 
$257,952 + $10,000 = $267,952 or 268% of original loan balance. 
See Barnes, supra, at 18. 
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lenders had to provide credit enhancements equaling 275 percent of the loan 
principal, subprime securitization would come to a halt. 
Despite these predictions, subprime securitization keeps growing, which 
suggests that loss severity risks are not hampering the securitization 
market.292  Indeed, “S&P insists that loss severity numbers by themselves 
do not say much.”293  Rather, it appears that even where S&P projects high 
loss severities, the company does not recommend correspondingly high 
credit enhancements.  For example, in a talk before industry representatives, 
S&P presented a worst-case projection suggesting that for a pool with five 
percent of high-cost loans originated in an assignee liability state with a loss 
severity level of 196 percent, the required credit enhancements for the AAA 
tranche would rise at most by eighteen percent.294  The assumption that five 
percent of loans in a pool are high-cost is likely excessive, thus inflating 
S&P’s calculation of the level of needed credit enhancements.  S&P’s own 
estimates suggest that the average proportion of high-cost loans in any one 
loan pool may be well under five percent.295
Even if S&P applied its formula ruthlessly, the required credit 
enhancements would exceed (and often far exceed) the actual risk involved.  
S&P’s formula assumes that every loan in default (plus twenty-five percent 
of performing loans) will be successfully litigated and result in maximum 
legal exposure.  As any experienced litigator knows, that is virtually never 
the case.  Indeed, state anti-predatory laws have deterred lenders from 
 292. See David Glehan, Director, S&P, PowerPoint Presentation at the Non-Prime 
Lending and Alternative Products Conference:  The Subprime Market 7 (June 10, 2005), 
http://events.mortgagebankers.org/nonprime2005/signatureconferences/nonprime/images/im
g/TheSubprimeMarket.pdf. 
 293. See Bergquist, supra note 290, at 9. 
 294. See Barnes & Mason, supra note 291, at 16.  The example used was Arkansas H.B. 
2598, which authorizes damages in the amount needed to extinguish the borrower’s liability 
under the loan, plus the total principal, interest, and fees already paid, plus attorneys’ fees 
and costs. See id. at 14.  Nominally, S&P calculates added credit enhancements as follows.  
S&P separately calculates the exposure from defensive claims (claims raised in defense to 
collection or foreclosure) and affirmative claims under state anti-predatory lending laws and 
adds them together.  For each type of claim, the agency uses the following principle to 
calculate the required credit enhancement:  
 
FF x LS = CER 
 
The foreclosure frequency (FF) is the probability of foreclosure and is assumed to include all 
loans in default.  (On top of the foreclosure frequency, S&P also assumes that one-quarter of 
subprime loans not in default will result in affirmative claims by borrowers).  The loss 
severity (LS) usually equals the maximum damages exposure in a particular jurisdiction.  
The required credit enhancement (CER) is then discounted by the percentage of high-cost 
loans in the loan pool.  S&P uses this methodology to price both potential individual claims 
and class action liability (where the class size can be determined). See id. at 14-16; S&P, 
supra note 135; S&P, supra note 284; Barnes, supra note 291, at 4. 
 295. S&P has determined that only one-one hundredth of one percent (0.01%) of U.S. 
home loans that it rated in 2004 were high-cost loans.  See S&P, supra note 273; cf. S&P, 
New Criteria Implemented, supra note 229 (noting that the proportion was low). 
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making unlawful high-cost loans.296  Nonetheless, S&P’s formula 
automatically “defaults to the remedy that reflects the worst-case scenario,” 
thereby inflating its credit enhancement projections.297  Perhaps this is why 
S&P says that “[a]s performance and loss information for the loans subject 
to additional credit enhancement develops, Standard & Poor’s will adjust its 
criteria as appropriate.”298
In reality, S&P rarely requires the credit enhancements it claims are 
necessary.  While S&P’s pronouncements on the subject have been 
inconsistent, its statements reveal wide-scale waiver of the official credit 
enhancement requirement.  Thus, in 2004, S&P officials said that added 
credit enhancements will be required only for loans from states with 
assignee liability laws that contain subjective standards and where no 
mitigating factors otherwise exist.299  Elsewhere, an S&P managing 
director assured lenders that for loan pools that have undergone satisfactory 
compliance review, where S&P considers the lender creditworthy, and 
where the lender reports which loans are governed by an assignee liability 
law, on “a case by case basis, S&P will allow the loans into a transaction 
and will track them through its TRENDS Database.”300  S&P will also 
waive added credit enhancements where the lender provides representations 
and warranties that the loan pool does not contain high-cost loans. 
In sum, for creditworthy lenders, S&P has sufficient confidence in 
automated compliance301 to allow high-cost loans into loan pools, subject 
to tracking, without the need for significant added credit enhancements.  
This suggests that the cost of assignee liability in terms of added credit 
enhancements under our proposal would be relatively low.  Combined with 
the low cost of due diligence and the large anticipated welfare effects to 
consumers and society from eliminating lending abuses,302 assignee 
liability would improve, not destroy, credit for underserved borrowers. 
 296. See Li & Ernst, supra note 92, at 11-12; Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 273, 
at 593-97. 
 297. See S&P, supra note 284. 
 298. See S&P, New Criteria Implemented, supra note 229. 
 299. See Barnes & Mason, supra note 291, at 2.  Mitigating factors that can reduce or 
eliminate the need for added credit enhancements include:  (1) damages arising only from a 
pattern or practice of violations; (2) liability only for knowing and/or intentional violations; 
(3) objective standards; (4) little or no litigation history; (5) rebuttable presumptions; (6) 
cure periods; (7) restrictions on affirmative or defensive claims; and (8) statutes of 
limitation. See id. at 6. 
 300. Barnes, supra note 291, at 19. 
 301. In a related context, Fitch stated that experience had demonstrated the accuracy and 
reliability of automated compliance systems:  
Based on results of the transaction loan sampling over the past 22 months, Fitch has 
determined that there has been excellent compliance with Fitch’s high cost loan criteria.  
Furthermore, compliance systems have become a critical component of the underwriting and 
quality control process, and the investment in these systems and the reliance on them has 
grown accordingly. 
FitchRatings, Fitch Revises RMBS Guidelines, supra note 135. 
 302. Robert Quercia and his co-authors made this point eloquently in a 2004 study of the 
North Carolina anti-predatory lending law, in which they demonstrated that almost ninety 
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E.  Our Proposal Could Help Solve Adverse Selection Problems That Harm 
Securitizers, Lenders and Borrowers 
Our assignee liability proposal could also help to solve the adverse 
selection problem caused by securitization, which could reduce the level of 
credit enhancements needed and the cost of credit to borrowers.  As we 
have discussed throughout this article, absent due diligence, “lemon loans” 
can escape detection during the securitization process.  Effective due 
diligence creates disincentives to adverse selection by lenders, and thus will 
deter the worst abuses.  This will help reduce the credit risk that arises from 
information asymmetries between lenders and the secondary market and 
reduce needed credit enhancements.  Ultimately, borrowers could benefit 
from these savings and pay less for their loans. 
Similarly, reports of abusive lending may have led potential borrowers, 
who would be desirable to lenders and the secondary market, to shy away 
from taking out loans.  To the extent that these borrowers believe that 
powerful anti-predatory lending laws will protect them, the laws may solve 
another adverse selection problem, which is that reports of predatory 
lending have driven “good” borrowers from the marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
In a 2004 report to Congress, GAO expressed optimism that market 
discipline by investors in subprime mortgage-backed securities would help 
drive out predatory lending.303  That optimism was misplaced.  Predatory 
loans continue to be financed by the capital markets.  Furthermore, 
experience has shown that the private-label secondary market will generally 
only screen out abusive loans when required to do so by law. 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development put it well when it 
said in the context of FHA-insured loans:  
Effective due diligence policies, uniformly applied by mortgagees prior to 
purchase, would cripple the ability of fraudulent lenders to pawn 
predatory loans off on others in the mortgage industry.  If predatory loans 
cannot be sold, they are unlikely to be made and all borrowers . . . will be 
protected.304
For the reasons we have described, the time has come to adopt assignee 
liability on a nationwide basis for securitized home loans. 
 
percent of the resulting decline in North Carolina refinance loans after passage of that law 
consisted of a reduction in loans with predatory features. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, 
supra note 273, at 593-97.  A 2006 study by the Center for Responsible Lending echoed 
their finding, reporting that the proportion of loans with specified predatory loan terms fell in 
many states with anti-predatory lending laws, relative to states without those laws. See Li & 
Ernst, supra note 92, at 11-12.  As both studies illustrate, the critical question is not whether 
lending fell in absolute terms, but what type of lending fell, bad or good. 
 303. See GAO, supra note 109, at 76-79. 
 304. See HUD, supra note 233. 
